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 In the typical criminal trial, a defendant is trying to prove he/she is not guilty because 
they were not the individual that committed the crime.  However, another type of defense exists 
in which the defendant admits they were the culprit, bu  provides an excuse in an attempt to 
avoid criminal punishment.  These so called “excuse def nses” include insanity, involuntary 
intoxication, age, and entrapment.  In all cases, juries are required to determine whether the 
defendant had sufficient mental capacity to form the intent to commit the crime.  Although jury 
decision making is a popular research area in psychology, relatively little has been done to 
examine excuse defenses.  In the following paper, three theoretical areas were discussed in 
relation to excuse defenses: excuses in interpersonal relationships, the traditional jury decision 
making Story Model, and social Attribution Theory.  A combined theory designed to specifically 
explain jury decision making in excuse defense cases was postulated and two experiments were 
performed to test this theory.  In Experiment 1, participants read a trial summary in which the 
type of excuse defense and aspects of Attribution Theory were varied.  Experiment 1 found weak 
support for the importance of Attribution Theory in jury decision making.  The strongest 
predictor of participants’ verdicts was the Crime Control versus Due Process Orientation.  
Conclusions based on Experiment 1 should be limited however due to a significant number of 
participant problems.  Experiment 2 utilized a card selection task in which participants chose 
which evidence they wished to view.  Experiment 2 found strong support that Attribution Theory 
plays an important part in jury decision making and that the importance of evidence changes 
depending on the type of excuse defense used.  For Entrapment, Consensus and Distinctiveness 
are both important, however, for Brain Damage, Distinctiveness evidence takes priority.  The 
 
 
proposed theory was discussed with regard to the evidence provided in the current experiments 
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The right to a trial by a jury of your peers is an integral part of the United States Judicial 
System.  The burden of determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant falls squarely on the 
shoulders of the jury, which, for the most part, is made up of average individuals whose only 
training consists of instructions provided by the judge at the time of the trial.  In a typical 
criminal trial, a defendant begins with a plea of eith r guilty or not guilty.  If the defendant 
pleads guilty, he/she acknowledges that he/she committed the offense, and the trial proceeds to 
the sentencing phase.  Meanwhile, if the defendant pleads not guilty, he/she is essentially 
claiming that he/she did not commit the crime; that t e police actually arrested the wrong person.  
The jury members are presented with evidence by the prosecution meant to convince the jury 
that the defendant is indeed the individual that committed the crime.  They are also presented 
with evidence by the defense attorneys meant to convince the jury that the defendant could not 
have been the individual that committed the crime (Mueller & Kirkpatrick, 1995).  However, a 
second type of trial exists in which the defendant pleads neither guilty nor not guilty, but rather 
offers up an excuse.  As a result, this second type of lea is typically referred to as an excuse 
defense.  The goal of this paper is to examine the theory behind how jurors make decisions 
regarding excuse defenses. 
These so called excuse defenses are a bit of a conundrum.  In one sense, the defendant is 
saying “Yes, I committed the crime”, which is in ess nce an admission of guilt.  However, at the 
same time they are also saying, “But I’m not guilty because of….”.   An excuse defense is 
formally defined as “a defense in which a person state  that his or her mental state was so 
impaired that he or she lacked the capacity to form sufficient intent to be held criminally 
responsible” (Siegal, 2009, p. 149).  Excuse defenss are derived from the difference between the 
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two common law standards of guilt: actus reus (evil act) and mens rea (evil mind).  A defendant 
is guilty by the standard of actus reus if he or she committed an illegal act.  In a typical trial, 
where an individual is trying to prove that he/she was not the person who committed the crime, 
they are trying to prove they lacked actus reus.  In other words, they did not commit the act, so 
are not guilty.  On the other hand, mens rea stands for whether the guilty individual had the 
intent to commit the crime.  If the defendant lacks intent (or cannot form intent due to 
impairment) then the individual cannot be said to have had mens rea and, therefore, cannot be 
found guilty (Siegal, 2009).  So in essence, with regard to an excuse defense trial, a juror is not 
trying to determine whether the defendant committed th  crime, but rather if the defendant 
intended to commit the crime.  
It should also be noted that excuse defenses differ from another class of defenses referred 
to as justification defenses, because excuse defenses focus on the lack of intent to commit the 
act, rather than the act being justified (Siegal, 2009).  In a justification defense, the defense 
acknowledges that the defendant committed an action that under normal circumstances would be 
considered criminal.  The defendant intended to commit that act, but claims that under the 
special circumstances that were present at the time, he action was not criminal – it was justified.   
The classic example of a justification defense is killing someone in self-defense.  Note that in an 
excuse defense, the defense stipulates that the act in question was a wrongful act, but claims that 
the defendant was not able to comport his/her actions t  the requirements of the law because he 
or she lacked mens rea.  In a justification defense, the defense claims that the act in question was 




Excuse defenses are also different from standard defens s in that they are part of a special 
class of defenses referred to as affirmative defenss.  In an affirmative defense, the burden of 
proof shifts from the prosecution to the defense.  This means that rather than the prosecution 
needing to prove above certain standards of proof (i.e. beyond a reasonable doubt) the defense 
must now prove that the defendant was sufficiently impaired to not have mens rea.  As a result, 
success with excuse defenses can often be difficult to obtain (Brody, Acker, & Logan, 2001).  It 
is important at this point to elucidate upon the legal version of impairment.  Impairment of the 
ability to form mens rea can occur in a number of different ways.  There are four officially 
recognized excuse defenses: insanity, intoxication, age  and entrapment; however, other excuse 
defenses may be possible if the defendant can prove that something interfered with his/her ability 
to have mens rea.  Each of the primary excuse defens s will now be examined individually 
(Siegal, 2009). 
Types of Excuse Defenses 
Insanity 
 Using the insanity defense (or insanity plea as it is sometimes referred to), occurs when a 
defendant makes the claim that at the time the crime was committed, due to some form of mental 
illness, his or her state of mind made it impossible for them to have mens rea.  In other words, 
because of their mental state, they were unable to understand the wrongfulness of their actions.  
For example, an individual with severe schizophrenia, who strikes his neighbor because he 
thinks the neighbor is an alien trying to abduct him, could not be found guilty of assault, because 
at the time of the crime he would have been considered legally insane.  If a defendant is 
successful in pleading insanity, they are typically ruled “Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity” 
(NGRI).  It should be noted, however, that the concept of legal insanity only partially overlaps 
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with the psychiatric concept of mental illness.  Insa ity is a legal term specifically related to the 
defendant’s inability to understand their actions, and as a result, many individuals who would 
qualify for a diagnosis of mental illness (such as depression) would not qualify for the insanity 
defense.  Instead of simply a psychiatric diagnosis, individuals are deemed legally insane based 
on certain legal standards such as the M’Naughten Rule or the Substantial Capacity Test (Siegal, 
2009).  To determine the defendant’s state of mind, a  expert forensic psychologist is typically 
employed to administer a battery of tests to determine the defendant’s capacity to form mens rea.  
Because of the attention gained in the press and its relatively close relationship with 
psychology, the insanity defense has generated the most research attention of all the excuse 
defenses.  Although much of the research involves how forensic psychology experts should 
determine insanity (i.e. Dror & Rosenthal, 2008), some of the research has actually looked at 
how juries decide in trials involving the insanity defense.  The insanity defense is different from 
other excuse defenses in that it relies strongly on an expert witness to tell juries whether or not an 
individual qualifies as insane (Siegal, 2009).  This places some of the duty to determine if the 
defendant is responsible or not in the hands of the orensic psychologist rather than the juror.  
Although it is of some interest how a jury member makes decisions based on expert testimony 
(e.g. Rendell, Huss, & Jensen, 2010), that is beyond the focus of this paper.  However, some 
studies regarding the insanity plea have removed th forensic expert from the equation, looking 
solely at juror decisions in insanity defense trials. 
For example, a study by Tezza (1996) examined different predictors of juror verdicts in 
insanity defense trials.  She presented undergrad partici ants with vignettes created using actual 
transcripts from cases where a defendant attempted an insanity defense.  The vignettes varied in 
the strength of the evidence presented and the severity of the crime committed.  Finally, the 
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author assessed several dispositional variables and attitudes of the participants.  Tezza found that 
there was an interaction between the ambiguity of the evidence and the severity, where the more 
severe the crime and more ambiguous the evidence, the less likely the defense was to be 
successful.  She also found, however, that previous negative views towards the insanity defense, 
an inaccurate understanding of mental illness, and authoritarianism significantly predicted guilty 
verdicts.  
Another study by Louden and Skeem (2007) specifically examined the effects juror 
attitudes have on their verdicts in insanity defense cases.  To accomplish this, the authors 
presented former jurors with four insanity defense case vignettes that were designed to evoke 
specific prototypes the jurors may have of the typical nsane person.  They also assessed each 
juror’s attitude toward the insanity defense.  The authors found that the attitudes of the jurors 
played a highly significant role in their verdicts.  On the same vignettes, individuals who had a 
favorable view of the insanity defense found the defendant insane 70.88% of the time, compared 
to individuals with a negative view of the insanity defense who only found the defendant insane 
16.67% of the time.  
Considering the results of these studies and that the burden of proof in all excuse pleas 
lies with the defense, it is not surprising that the insanity defense is not used very often.  
Furthermore, even when the defense is utilized, it has proven to be only marginally effective.  
The insanity defense is often thought of as being over used and has arguably gained the most 
attention in pop culture.  However, multistate studies have found that the insanity defense was 
actually used in less than 1% of all trials, and of th se 1%, the defense was successful only 26% 
of the time (Callahan, Steadman, McGreevy, & Robbins, 1991; Pasewark & McGinley, 1985).  
This study is rather outdated, but there does not appe r to have been any attempt made at this 
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time to examine more current rates.  Overall, given its close relationship to psychology, the 
insanity defense has received a great deal of jury research.  As a result, the insanity defense will 
be frequently referred to later when discussing the pot ntial theories of juror decision making. 
Intoxication 
 In an intoxication defense, the defense argues that the defendant was unable to comport 
their behavior to the requirements of the law because their judgment and reasoning was impaired 
due to drugs or alcohol.  Intoxication is only considered a defense if the defendant was 
involuntarily or accidentally intoxicated, for example if someone else spiked their drink (Siegal, 
2009).  There has been some sparse research regarding the involuntary intoxication defense, 
especially recently with regard to certain side effcts with anti-depressants that may cause 
violence; however, at this time the articles merely speculate an increase in the use of an “SSRI 
excuse defense” rather than providing empirical evid nce (e.g. Myers & Vondruska, 1998).  Also 
of interest regarding intoxication are the effects of long term drug and alcohol usage.  Some of 
the effects of extended usage of a drug could appear similar to symptoms in non-substance 
related disorders. 
 For example, a study by Heath, Grannemann, and Thomps n (2009) examined juror 
verdicts in an assault trial where the participant used a more generalized excuse defense.  They 
included variables concerning whether the impairment utilized in the excuse was self inflicted, 
the victim’s respectability, and the severity of the assault.  To test the effect of whether the 
excuse was self inflicted or not, the authors used two somewhat prominent excuse defenses: Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) from a war veteran (a form of insanity plea) and Cocaine 
Dependency Disorder (CDD) from a former cocaine addict (a loose form of the intoxication 
defense).  Both disorders result in extremely similar symptoms (which were described to the 
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participants using an identical definition), and according to the authors only differed in how 
much they were self-inflicted.  The authors found that all three variables had a significant impact 
on participants’ verdicts.  In general, participants were more likely to accept the PTSD excuse 
defense over the CCD defense.  The participants also were more likely to find the defendant not 
guilty when the defendant was more respectable, and the lower the severity of the assault, the 
more likely the participants were to acquit the defendant.  The implications of this study will be 
discussed in depth later. 
Age 
 Age as an excuse defense is defined based on the conc pt that children under a certain 
age are unable to understand that what they did was wrong.  For the most part, the age is defined 
by common law statute which states that children under the age of seven are incapable of 
understanding the gravity of the situation.  Meanwhile, children over the age of 14 are typically 
thought of as having the ability to discern right from wrong and cannot use age as an excuse 
defense.  There is a gray middle ground area between the age of seven and 14 where the age 
defense may be used, but is questionable.  It is in this range that jurors are placed in a situation 
where they must decide if the child had the ability to form mens rea, and therefore whether or not 
they can be found guilty of the crime.  Age as an excuse defense may only be used in 
circumstances in which a minor is being tried in adult court, but it is unclear how often this type 
of defense is actually utilized (Siegal, 2009).  Logically, if the minor lacked the sufficient mental 
capacity to form mens rea, both the judge and prosecution would not have recommended moving 
the case to the adult courts in the first place.  As a result, to date, there does not seem to be any 





Entrapment is a somewhat peculiar excuse defense in that it uses a rather loose version of 
the term “impairment”.  In an entrapment defense, th  defendant’s ability to form mens rea is 
impaired because of the actions of an agent of law enforcement (Siegal, 2009).  The possibility 
of an entrapment defense exists with all undercover p ations, which are typically referred to as 
“proactive investigations”.  Frequently, undercover “proactive” investigations are used in cases 
involving drugs and prostitution, to catch both dealers and potential customers (Mitchell, Wolak, 
& Finkelhor, 2005).  The underlying assumption in the use of proactive investigations is that the 
arrested individual had a predisposition to commit the crime, and therefore, would have 
committed the crime eventually if they had not been apprehended.  At the core of the entrapment 
issue regarding proactive investigations is the question: do these law enforcement agents merely 
provide an opportunity for criminals, or are they completely manufacturing a crime that would 
not have occurred in the first place (Mitchell, Wolak, & Finkelhor)?  The use of the entrapment 
defense has been used with limited success in areassuch as prostitution or drug operations (Lord, 
1998; Miceli, 2007).  
In Sorrells v. U.S., one of the landmark cases concerning the entrapment defense, the 
Supreme Court held that officers or employees of the government, who merely afford 
opportunities for the commission of an offense, do not defeat the prosecution’s case (Rubin, 
2001).  The Court, however, drew a line when the criminal design originated with officials of the 
government and not within the mind of an innocent person.  If the government instigates an 
individual’s conduct through use of “fraud, trickery, encouragement, persuasion, or 
importunity”, the prosecution will be unsuccessful.  In Sherman v. U.S., the Court held that the 
function of law enforcement does not include the “manufacture of crime”.  The case of U.S. v. 
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Russell, upheld the Sorrells case, reaffirming that “to determine whether entrapment has been 
established, a line must be drawn between the trap fo  the unwary innocent and the trap for the 
unwary criminal”.  The Russell case restated that entrapment applies only when the 
government’s actions implant the criminal design in the mind of the defendant. 
In the case of Jacobson v. U.S., a two-part test was utilized to determine whether  
entrapment defense applied.  The test used by the Court in this case was 1) did the government 
cross the line between setting a trap for the “unwary innocent” and the “unwary criminal” 2) and 
whether the prosecution could establish that the def n ant was predisposed to commit the 
offense.  “When the government’s quest for convictions leads to the apprehension of an 
otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul 
of the law, the courts should intervene” (Rubin, 2001). 
 In State of North Carolina v. Luster, the court employed a two step analysis, “1) acts of 
persuasion, trickery or fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or their agents to induce a 
defendant to commit a crime, 2) when the criminal design originated in the minds of the 
government officials, rather than with the innocent defendant, such that the crime is the product 
of the creative activity of the law enforcement authorities”.   When the entrapment defense is 
raised, the central issue becomes whether or not the defendant was predisposed to commit the 
offense.  After predisposition has been proven, the def nse of entrapment is no longer applicable 
(Rubin, 2001).  There has been very little research performed in psychology on entrapment; 
however, of all the excuse defenses, entrapment places the largest burden on the juror, rather 
than some expert, to determine intent.  As a result, examining what the courts have charged 
jurors to decide in entrapment defense cases may prove helpful in better understanding the 
psychology of excuse defenses in general. 
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 For example, a study by Peters, Lampinen, and Malesky (2012) examined juror decisions 
for cases involving a defendant accused of soliciting a minor over the internet who pleads not 
guilty by reason of entrapment.  To examine this, tree experiments were run in which 
participants were presented with trial vignettes in which three variables were manipulated: who 
initiated the solicitation (the defendant, the agent once, or the agent several times), the inclusion 
of the entrapment defense, and prior behaviors of the defendant.  Both the solicitation variable 
and entrapment defense variable were significant.  Participants found the defendant not guilty 
significantly more often when the agent solicited the defendant first than when the defendant 
initiated the solicitation.  Participants were also less likely to find the defendant guilty when the 
entrapment defense was utilized than when it was not; however, there were no significant 
interactions between the two variables.  This study also examined attribution of responsibility 
and participants’ prior world beliefs.   These two variables will be discussed later in the 
theoretical sections. 
Unspecified Excuse Defense 
 The aforementioned four types of excuse defenses are those formally acknowledged by 
the courts; however, it is possible (if allowed by the judge) for the defense to present an excuse 
defense other than those previously mentioned.  Such defenses are typically examined in a case 
by case format based on whether the judge determines the excuse to validly challenge the proof 
of mens rea.  In theory, there is no limit to the number of things that could serve as an excuse 
defense, and as a result, it is somewhat difficult to examine jury decisions on unspecified excuse 
defenses (Siegal, 2009).  However, a couple of unspecified excuses have gained research 
attention: battered-spouse syndrome, in which the def nse claims the defendant’s ability to 
determine right from wrong was impaired by their repeated abuse at the hands of the perpetrator 
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(Schuller, 1992), and a crime of passion, in which it is claimed that the individual lost control of 
their mental facilities in the “heat of passion”.  Although neither are formally acknowledged by 
the courts, both have been used as viable defenses. 
 As can be seen, there are a wide variety of excuse defenses.  Although they may involve 
different types of excuses, they’re all based on the idea that the defendant’s mental capacity to 
form intent was impaired for some reason.  The question then becomes: how does a jury member 
determine whether the defendant had all the mental tools necessary to form mens rea?  In an 
attempt to answer this question, three separate theoretical areas will be examined in relation to 
excuse defenses: excuses in interpersonal relationships, the traditional jury decision making 
Story Model, and Attribution Theory.  To begin with, I will examine how excuses are viewed in 
general in the context of interpersonal relationship . 
Excuses in Interpersonal Relationships 
 Before one attempts to examine how excuses are viewed in the context of the legal 
system, it would be useful to understand how excuses ar  viewed in the course of everyday life.  
Schlenker, Pontari, and Christopher (2001) define excuses as “self-serving explanations, or 
accounts that aim to reduce personal responsibility for questionable events, thereby disengaging 
core components of the self from the incident” (p. 15).  In other words, excuses are reasons that 
an individual provides to escape accountability when they have either failed at a prescribed task, 
or committed a socially undesirable act.  Much of the research on excuses has been performed to 
determine how excuses affect the performer intrapersonally, and is imbedded within impression 
management theory (Schlenker, 1985).  Generally, the effect of excuses on the individual is seen 
in a positive light, with excuses helping to protect an individual’s self-esteem, decrease 
depression, reduce anxiety and negative affect, and improve overall health (see Snyder & 
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Higgins, 1988 for a review).  Some negative intrapesonal effects of excuses have also been also 
been noted; however, given the focus of this paper on how others view excuses, an in depth 
report is beyond the scope of the current discourse.  Instead, I will focus on the effects excuses 
have on interpersonal relationships. 
Views of Excuses in Interpersonal Relationships 
 When it comes to interpersonal relationships, there are both advantages and 
disadvantages of offering excuses (Schlenker et al., 2001).  Weiner et al. (1987) performed two 
studies in which they examined how participants would react to individuals using an excuse to 
avoid backlash when breaking some sort of social contract.  In their first study, participants 
arrived at a study that should last only 5-10 minutes.  Participants were then informed the study 
was designed to determine individuals’ initial impressions of others based on meeting them only 
for a short time period.  They were also told they would start as soon as the second participant 
arrived.  The second participant (a confederate) arrived 15 minutes late, and provided either an 
externalizing excuse (that an exam had held them over), an internalizing excuse (they had simply 
lost track of time), or no excuse at all.  The authors found that the externalizing excuse resulted 
in lower levels of anger, resentment, irritation, ad dislike, and greater forgiveness than the 
internalizing excuse or no excuse at all.  Furthermore, those giving the internalizing and no 
excuse were seen as less dependable, responsible, considerate, sensitive, and interesting, than 
those giving the externalizing excuse.  There was no difference at all between the internalizing 
excuse and no excuse conditions. 
 In their second study, Weiner et al. (1987) used a similar setup; however, this time 
instead of using a confederate, they had a second partici ant be the one to make the excuse.  To 
accomplish this, they instructed the two participants to report to different rooms.  The 
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experimenters provided the first participant with the same instructions as in the first study, but 
the second participant was asked to act like they had been late, and come up with an excuse to 
tell the other participant.  The second participant was told to come up with either a bad excuse, a 
good excuse, any excuse, or no excuse.  An initial ex mination revealed that when the 
participants were told to use any excuse, they created very similar types of excuses to those 
participants who were told to utilize bad excuses.  Even when the participants were allowed to 
create their own excuses, they were viewed in a more p sitive light when they provided 
externalizing excuses than internalizing excuses or no excuses at all.  Based on the results of the 
two studies, the authors concluded that if a person can provide an excuse that is of external 
origin, it can aid the individual in avoiding the ngative repercussions of violating a social 
contract. 
 Another study by Crant and Bateman (1993) examined th  effects of two types of 
excuses, self-handicapping and causal accounts, on employees in the workplace.  Self-
handicapping is a type of excuse that actually occurs before a specific task is even attempted.  
Essentially, the individual claims to be at some sort of disadvantage, that way if the task is failed, 
blame is shifted to the disadvantage.  Meanwhile, if the task is successful, the individual receives 
even more credit for overcoming the disadvantage.  Causal accounts on the other hand are more 
traditional excuses that are offered after the individual has failed at a task that seek to shift the 
blame to some sort of external source.  
To examine the potential effects of these excuses, th  authors presented actual employees 
and managers at an accounting firm with a scenario in which a fictional employee made a critical 
error in the auditing of an important client of the firm.  In some versions, the employee gave a 
self-handicap indicating the great difficulty of the task (by asserting that the program used had a 
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number of bugs in it).  In other versions, the employee gave a post hoc excuse for why he failed 
(because changes by the client made the task particul ly difficult).  The researchers found that 
when either a self-handicap was used before the task, or when a post hoc excuse was given, 
participants afforded the errant employee less blame for his failure, than when no excuse was 
given.  Furthermore, they found that the error result d in less punishment when an excuse was 
present (Crant & Bateman, 1993).  This study indicates that not only can excuses reduce the 
negative impressions individuals have towards the transgressor, but also result in substantive 
differences in how they are punished.  However, despit  tudies that show the benefits of using 
excuses, there are others that have shown potential neg tive effects as well (Schlenker et al., 
2001). 
Schlenker and his colleagues (2001) argued that excessive or poor use of excuses, 
regardless of type, can damage an individuals’ perceived character by undermining how others 
view the individuals’ integrity, effectiveness, and commitment to the greater good.  In other 
words, overreliance on excuses could result in the excuser being viewed as more deceitful, 
ineffective, and self-absorbed, all of which decrease their reliability and their view as being able 
to contribute to a societal group.  Evidence for this claim can be found in a study by Pontari, 
Schlenker, and Christopher (2002).  In their study, Pontari and colleagues presented university 
students with a number of different scenarios designed to capture a variety of possible problems 
that can occur when using excuses.  First, they examined instances where there was either 
corroborative evidence for an excuse or evidence that was somewhat contrary to the excuse.  
Then they examined individuals that chronically used the same excuses, as well as individuals 
that failed to fix the problem that they used as an excuse.  Finally, they examined individuals 
who blame their allies as an excuse.  Following the reading of the scenarios, the authors assessed 
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participants’ opinions about the deceptiveness, ineffectiveness, and self-absorption of the 
excuser, as well as how much they were to blame for the incident and the legitimacy of the 
excuse.  
Results showed that when the individual lacked corrobo ating evidence, had a history of 
making excuses, did not try to correct the problem, or blamed their teammates, they were viewed 
in a significantly more negative light on all three types of character.  Furthermore, they were also 
viewed as more blameworthy and their excuses as being l ss legitimate.  However, if the excuser 
did have corroborating evidence, attempted to corret the problem, did not blame teammates, or 
accepted responsibility, their excuses were better accepted and they were viewed in a more 
positive light.  Overall, it appears that when the excuses were used improperly, the participants’ 
views of the excuser were much worse than if he had not used an excuse in the first place 
(Pontari et al., 2002). 
Another area that logically would affect views of the excuser’s character would be the 
believability of their excuses.  One study extended the previously mentioned findings of excuses 
within the workplace by examining employees’ views of an excuse used by their boss in turning 
down a request they made (Bies, Shapiro, & Cummings, 1988).  In this study, instead of reading 
vignettes, participants were asked to recall an evet where they had made a request their boss 
refused and the boss had provided reasons for that efusal.  They then rated how much they felt 
external circumstances caused the boss’s decision, as well as the perceived sincerity of the 
excuse.  Finally, they indicated their feelings of anger, fairness, and whether they complained.  
The authors found that the greatest predictors of the employees’ negative emotions were the 
perceived adequacy and sincerity of the excuses provided.  In other words, only excuses that 
seemed adequate at explaining the reasons for the refusal and excuses that were sincere were 
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effective in reducing the negative impact of the refusal.  Excuses that failed these two standards 
actually resulted in worse reactions to the excuser. 
Another study by Ohbuchi and Sato (1993) extended findings regarding excuses to how 
children viewed excuses versus apologies depending on the intentionality of the transgression.  
The authors presented second and fifth grade Japanese children with vignettes in which a boy 
damaged the property of another boy who had beaten him in a game earlier.  The damage was 
either caused intentionally or unintentionally, and when confronted, the culprit either gave an 
apology, an excuse, or no response.  The results showed that when the offense was intentional, 
the children provided less responsibility and punishment when an apology was offered, but not 
when an excuse was offered or no response was given.  If the offense was unintentional, both the 
apology and excuse afforded a lower negative reaction.  In other words, the children accepted the 
excuses if the harm was perceived as unintentional, but if the harm was perceived as intentional, 
the excuse was ineffective.  
In a similar study, this time with college student participants, the effectiveness of excuses 
was examined when an individual had broken a rule (Wallis & Kleinke, 1995).  Participants were 
shown a story in which an individual had arrived for a makeup exam, but was thoroughly 
unprepared.  When given the opportunity, the student cheated by looking at the professor’s exam 
key, but was subsequently caught in the act by the professor.  The student then either offered an 
external excuse (the test was too hard), an internal xcuse (he would feel awful if he failed), or 
accepted responsibility.  The authors found that when t e student offered either an external or 
internal excuse, the participants assigned more blame to the student and afforded him a harsher 
grade penalty.  The authors concluded that because of th  obvious intentionality of the student’s 
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transgression, that neither excuse was plausible and so resulted in a worse penalty than simply 
accepting responsibility. 
Therefore, although good excuses may help to shift responsibility from the excuser, the 
effect on evaluations of their character could be detrimental, especially if the excuses are 
improperly used.  Such individuals then could be ostracized from the group, or relegated to tasks 
of lower responsibility and reward.  For example, a study by Smith and Strube (1991) had 
participants decide among a group of individuals which ones would be accepted for a prestigious 
summer internship program.  Participants were provided with a vignette in which a candidate for 
the internship was about to take an exam they were unprepared for.  The candidate either 
provided an excuse resulting from an internal source, an excuse caused by external 
circumstances, or no excuse at all.  Although both excuses were effective in reducing 
responsibility for a failing grade on the exam, they also both resulted in more negative views of 
the candidate.  Furthermore, they resulted in a lower likelihood that the individual would be 
recommended for the internship. 
Finally, Rhodewalt and colleagues (1995) used a rathe  creative approach to examine the 
effectiveness of different self-handicapping excuses.  They placed participants in rooms where 
they were instructed to create humorous captions for newspaper cartoons.  Following the creation 
of the captions, they were then asked to evaluate the captions of another participant.  That 
participant either provided a self-handicapping excuse involving anxiety, low effort, drug 
intoxication, or did not provide an excuse at all.  The authors found that participants providing an 
excuse of low effort or drug intoxication were evaluated more negatively than excuses that 
involved anxiety or when the individual provided no excuse.  They concluded that participants 
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viewed the lack of effort or the drug intoxication as being self-inflicted and therefore poor 
excuses. 
In summary, the research seems to point to the fact th t when used properly, excuses can 
be highly beneficial.  ‘Good’ excuses can help to maintain internal self-esteem and self-worth, as 
well as work to decrease punishment or conflict with others.  However, if used improperly, the 
excuse can have a detrimental effect on how others vi w the excuser.  An improper excuse can 
be caused by a number of different reasons as mentioned above; however, they can all result in a 
decrease in the excuser’s perceived character.  In many cases, this detrimental effect from using 
a poor excuse is not only worse than using a good excuse, but worse than just accepting 
responsibility for the action and apologizing.  So now the question is: how does this fit in with 
jurors and excuse defenses? 
Application to Excuse Defenses 
 Taken at face value, general research on how individuals view excuses is comparable to 
how jurors will view the excuse when it is initially brought forth by the defense.  However, once 
jurors have been provided with the judicial instrucions on how they are supposed to interpret the 
excuse defense, things may change.  Many of the findings concerning excuses place emphasis on 
the character of the excuser and how they will be viewed.  According to judicial instructions, 
jurors are not supposed to decide whether they like the defendant or whether they forgive them, 
but rather whether the defendant had the mental capcity to have understood the wrongfulness of 
their actions.  They are two very different questions. 
 That being said, it is a well established finding i  jury research that jurors tend to be 
easily biased by their emotions and personal feelings towards the trial participants (Boyll, 1991).  
Therefore, if excuses can in fact damage the character of the defendant, then the findings within 
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the general excuse defense literature could definitly have an impact on juror verdicts.  Also, 
some of the findings involving what is considered a good excuse seem particularly applicable to 
excuse defenses.  First off, the finding of Rhodewalt and collegues (1995) that self-inflicted 
excuses are viewed less favorably could have a very direct impact on some excuse defenses.  For 
example, say a defendant claimed the insanity defens  for murdering their neighbor because they 
had paranoid delusions that their neighbor was trying to abduct them.  However, let’s say the 
individual had the paranoid delusions because they had a history of drug abuse that had 
permanently damaged their brain.  Based on the Rhodewalt and collegues finding, one would 
expect jurors to vote in favor of the drug abusing defendant less often than a defendant who was 
diagnosed with schizophrenia.  
Another aspect that could be seen as especially important could be the believability 
findings in several of the studies.  Essentially, if the excuse was viewed as believable, it was 
more likely to be accepted.  This makes sense, considering why would an individual accept an 
excuse they believed was a lie?  However, plausibility a so plays a critical role in a model which 
I will discuss momentarily.  Overall, although research on excuse defenses in general may help 
us understand how individuals view excuses in the real world, given the complexities of the task, 
it is insufficient to explain how jurors may view excuse defenses in the court room.  Therefore, it 
is necessary to also examine excuse defenses from a general jury decision making model.  The 
following section presents actual jury decision making research, including research done on 
actual excuse defenses. 
Jury Decision Making Story Model 
 There have been a number of different jury decision making models proposed (Penrod & 
Hastie, 1979); however, the predominant theory is Pennington and Hastie’s (1993) story model.  
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Pennington and Hastie’s story model is a theory of how jurors use all the evidence to render their 
verdicts.  According to the theory, jurors also bring with them different variations of world 
knowledge and use this knowledge to help interpret th  evidence.  According to Hastie and 
Pennington (2000), it is this variation in world knowledge that results in different stories (and 
therefore potential verdicts) being formed by each of the jurors.  The story model is based on the 
idea that a juror makes a decision regarding the guilt or innocence of a defendant by first 
constructing stories in their mind of how the event may have occurred.  To do this, the juror first 
combines all the evidence from both sides.  Following this they also formulate a number of 
different inferences related to the evidence based on their own general world knowledge by 
utilizing a variety of deductive and inductive logic methods (Collins & Michalski, 1989).  Once 
the juror creates each side’s story, they evaluate the stories by four standards or “certainty 
principles”: coverage, coherence, uniqueness, and Goodness-of-Fit (Pennington & Hastie, 1993). 
Four Certainty Principles 
Coverage refers to whether or not all the information provided by the evidence can be 
integrated into the story. The more evidence is integrated into the story, the greater the coverage; 
however, if critical pieces of evidence are not integrated well, the perceived coverage will 
decrease (Pennington and Hastie, 1993).  For example, consider a trial in which an individual is 
accused of soliciting a prostitute, but claims he was entrapped by the undercover agent who was 
posing as the prostitute.  The defendant makes the claim that he had no intention of soliciting a 
prostitute and would not have committed the crime; however, the defense’s argument fails to 
explain about the fact that the defendant had no reason to be in an area well known to be a 
prostitution hangout.  In this case, the defendant’s story lacks the integration of critical evidence, 
and is therefore weakened. 
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Coherence meanwhile is governed by the story’s consistency, completeness, and 
plausibility.  In order to obtain coherence, the story must satisfy all three aspects.  A story 
experiences consistency when the evidence works well together.  If the pieces of evidence 
contradict each other, the story will lack consistency.  For example, if a defendant claims to have 
been asleep at the time of the crime, but several witnesses testify that they saw him near the 
location of the crime, there would appear to be an inconsistency in the story.  Completeness 
refers to if the story given by that particular side s all exhibited in the evidence presented.  For 
example, if the prosecution makes the claim that a particular weapon belonged to the defendant, 
but had no evidence of such, then a critical component of their story is missing and the story 
would lack completeness.  Finally, plausibility refers to whether or not the story is possible or 
consistent with how the juror views the real world.  Stories that seem impossible or highly 
unlikely will be viewed as less plausible (Pennington and Hastie, 1993).  For instance, if a 
defendant claimed he was involuntarily intoxicated b cause the bartender must have slipped 
something in his drink, this is an unlikely story and would typically be viewed as less plausible.   
Given the importance of coherence in the model, it has experienced a great deal of 
research.  For example, research on the consistency aspect of coherence has found that 
inconsistencies in a single prosecution witness’s testimony (Berman & Cutler, 1996; Berman, 
Narby, & Cutler, 1995) and among multiple prosecution witnesses (Brewer, Potter, Fisher, Bond, 
& Luszcz, 1999) resulted in lower conviction rates.  Another study by Harris and Hahn (2009) 
found that it was possible to simulate and formally measure this concept of multiple witnesses’ 
consistency by using a Bayesian approach. 
 Uniqueness refers to whether or not the story is the only coherent story provided.  A story 
at first may seem to have high coherence, but if a second opposing story is also able to explain 
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the evidence just as well, the initial story will suffer from a lack of uniqueness.  Uniqueness 
affects the jurors’ confidence in the story, and as a result, the juror’s perception of the coverage 
and coherence of the story will decrease as well.  For example, consider a case in which the 
prosecution weaves a story of how the defendant in a murder trial was angry at the victim 
(motive), was in the same location as the victim (opportunity), and owned a golf club similar to 
the one used in the crime (means). However, the defns  explains the same evidence based on 
the idea that yes, the defendant was angry at the victim, but people get angry at each other all the 
time, yes the defendant was in the same location because they work together, and yes he owned 
such an item, but lots of people own golf clubs.  In essence, the defense has explained the same 
evidence, but in a different fashion, therefore, th first story is no longer unique in its ability to 
explain the evidence and will decrease in the likelihood that it will be selected by the jury 
(Pennington and Hastie, 1993).  A study by Penningto  and Hastie (1988) found that when they 
manipulated the participants’ ability to form a story from the testimony, the uniqueness of the 
testimony affected the confidence and coherence of that story. 
 Finally, the last certainty principle, Goodness-of-Fit, does not actually come into play 
until the jurors are trying to choose between the possible verdicts (Pennington and Hastie, 1993).  
Once a jury has heard all the evidence of a case, they are provided through judicial instruction 
with a list of possible verdicts as well as a description of the verdicts.  For instance, in a 
homicide case, the potential verdicts that the jurors have the option to choose between could be 
not guilty, guilty of man-slaughter, guilty of second degree murder, or guilty of first degree 
murder.  Each of the verdict options in turn have their own criteria that must be filled in order for 
their verdict to be rendered.  Take first degree murder, for example.  In order to be found guilty 
of first degree murder, “the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable 
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doubt: 1. [Victim] is dead. 2. The death was caused by the criminal act of [defendant]. 3. There 
was a premeditated killing of [victim]” (The Suprem Court Committee on Standard Jury 
Instructions in Criminal Cases, 2010).  The jury will take the story they chose based on the 
previous three certainty principles, and attempt to compare it to the criteria for each of the 
verdicts.  The criteria that their story fits best will be the verdict they choose.  However, if the 
story does not fit any of the set criteria, the juror will pick the default verdict.  Given the typical 
standard of innocent until proven guilty, the default verdict is not guilty, therefore if the stories 
do not fit any of the criteria for a guilty verdict, the juror will vote not guilty.  
 A study by Smith (1991), found that the certainty principle of Goodness-of-Fit is 
particularly susceptible to interference from previous knowledge on the part of the juror.  In her 
first experiment, Smith had participants create general versions of what they believed constituted 
a variety of different crimes.  She found that participants for the most part had a number of 
common naïve understandings of crimes; however, not all these naïve understandings were 
correct.  For example, one common finding is that par icipants confused assault (threat of 
physical harm) with battery (actually causing physical harm).  These naïve understandings have 
been empirically shown to come from a number of settings, but the most common are from 
forms of mass media (i.e. news reports of crimes, or television shows depicting trials, Hans, 
1990).  In her second and third experiments Smith then had the participants determine verdicts 
for certain scenarios.  In the second experiment, she let them perform this task with no 
instructions, while in the third experiment, the participants were provided with judicial 
instructions as to what each verdict meant.  She found that even though the judicial instructions 
did have some effect in helping decide which verdict to choose, the naïve understandings that the 
participants brought with them still significantly influenced their judgments.  These findings are 
24 
 
similar to McCloksey, Washburn, and Felch’s (1983) findings that lay people have naïve and 
often mistaken conceptions of physics and that to produce correct understandings of physical 
concepts such as momentum, it is not enough to teach the correct principle, but rather, it is 
necessary to dispel learners incorrect conceptions.  Ba ed on all four principles of coverage, 
coherence, uniqueness, and Goodness-of-Fit, the juror will choose the ‘best’ story to base their 
verdict on (Pennington and Hastie, 1993).  
Empirical Evidence  
 Evidence for the story model was initially provided in a seminal study by Pennington and 
Hastie (1981, 1986).  To examine their theory, the authors began by showing participants a video 
of a mock trial in which a defendant was accused of first degree murder.  After watching the 
video, participants were asked to choose a verdict of either not guilty, guilty of manslaughter, 
guilty of second-degree murder, or guilty of first-degree murder.  During the entire process, 
participants were asked to talk out loud about the evidence and their decision making process.  
Afterwards, they were then asked to recall what they could about the different possible verdicts 
and their meanings.  The talk out loud and memory interviews were then coded to locate story-
type remarks (references to events that occurred on the day of the crime) and verdict remarks 
(references to judicial instructions or anything else related to the participant’s actual verdicts).  
The story-type remarks were separated into explicit story references and story explanations.  
Explicit story references were remarks that related directly back to evidence presented in the 
trial, though they still could be inferential in nature.  Explanation type remarks meanwhile were 
statements that attempted to elaborate on the evidence presented using the world knowledge that 
the participant brought with them to the study.  Finally, the remarks were separated based on the 
verdicts the participants gave and combined to form a different story for each verdict type.  
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 Pennington and Hastie (1981, 1986) found that eachof t e stories differed significantly 
from each other, and that each juror’s individual story was significantly more similar to their 
verdict’s general story, than to the other verdicts’ general stories.  From their data they 
concluded that 1) a substantial proportion of the story-type comments were inferential rather than 
actually being included in the evidence, 2) participants’ statements did actually represent a sort 
of story structure, and 3) this story structure could be connected to their verdict of choice. 
 A second seminal study was also performed by Pennington and Hastie (1988).  The goal 
of the second study was to directly test the spontanei y of the participants’ story construction, as 
well as to determine if the stories mediate their vrdicts.  To accomplish this goal, the authors 
used two different experiments.  In the first experim nt, participants were given a recognition 
memory task to determine if they had created a story structure.  A recognition task was used 
because of some recent research at the time by Kintsch (1986) which claimed that when a 
memory for a story is made, it consists of verbatim representations of the surface structure, a 
propositional textbase, and an interpretive situation model.  The authors hypothesized that if the 
jurors were actually creating a story, it would hold a l three of these aspects.  Furthermore, they 
expected that recognition memory would be highest for queues that can be found represented in 
all three areas (Perrig & Kintsch, 1985).  Therefor, with regard to jury decision making, the 
participants should have the highest recognition memory for sentences that match their chosen 
verdict’s story (Pennington & Hastie). 
 To examine their hypothesis, the authors presented participants with the same trial as in 
their first study (Pennington & Hastie, 1981; Pennington & Hastie, 1986).  They then extracted 
93 sentences from the stories created in the first study.  The sentences were separated into guilty 
story, not guilty story, and neutral sentences.  The authors found that participants were 
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significantly more likely to recognize sentences that fit with their chosen verdict’s story model 
than sentences that fit with the opposite model.  They therefore concluded that their participants 
spontaneously generated their stories without the help of an external interviewer’s input 
(Pennington & Hastie, 1988).  
 In the second experiment, the authors attempted to manipulate which verdict the 
participants would chose, by increasing the difficulty of creating either the defense’s or 
prosecution’s story (Pennington & Hastie, 1988).  To increase the difficulty of creating the 
stories, Pennington and Hastie modified the order that evidence was presented.  They considered 
the easy story creation setup to be one in which the evidence was presented in a story (temporal 
and causal) order.  Meanwhile, the difficult story c eation setup involved a non-story order in 
which evidence was presented in a “witness by witness” format.  Therefore, a pro-defense trial 
would be one in which the defense’s evidence was pre ented in story order format, but the 
prosecution’s evidence was presented in a witness by witness order format.  The authors 
expected that the participants would tend to side more often with the side that was presented in 
the story order format.  Their hypothesis proved correct.  The authors found that the participants 
were significantly more likely to rule in favor of the side whose story was easier to form.  They 
also found that participants viewed the evidence as significantly stronger when it was presented 
in story format than witness by witness format.  They concluded that the construction of a story 
was essential to verdict choice (Pennington & Hastie, 1988). 
 The third primary study in their line of research consisted of three experiments 
(Pennington & Hastie, 1992).  The first experiment attempted to replicate experiment two from 
their previous study (Pennington & Hastie, 1988), while accounting for an argument that their 
results could have occurred simply because of differences in memory for the trials.  To 
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accomplish this, the authors used a shorter trial version in which they manipulated both the way 
the evidence was presented (story versus issue) and the credibility of one of four witnesses 
whose testimony was inconsistent with that of the other three witnesses.  They found that the 
manipulation of evidence presentation had an effect on the verdicts, with the story versions 
resulting in significantly higher in-line verdicts than the issue versions, in the absence of any 
differences in memory for the two trial versions.  They further found that the manipulation of the 
evidence presentation method mediated the effects of the inconsistent witness’s credibility. 
 In the previous two experiments (Pennington and Hastie, 1988; Pennington and Hastie, 
1992, Experiment 1), the authors manipulated the ord r of evidence to modify the completeness 
of the participants’ story construction.  In experiments two and three of the current study, 
Pennington and Hastie (1992) sought to manipulate this perception of completeness in a different 
way: by supplementing the directly provided evidence with common inferences made by 
participants in previous studies.  They expected that t ese inferences would help to create a more 
complete story.  They also manipulated the amount of times the participants were asked to 
provide feedback.  In other words, participants were either asked to render a single final verdict 
at the end of the trial, or smaller mini-verdicts after each piece of evidence was added.  The 
authors expected that the incremental verdicts would interfere with story creation, because it 
would involve simply modifying an anchor with new information rather than forming a complete 
situational model.  Experiments two and three were basically identical, with experiment three 
adding a counter-balancing.  The results showed evience in favor of their predictions.  In both 
studies, the supplemental material swayed participants’ verdicts in the direction of the inference.  
Furthermore, the effect was strongest in the single final verdict version.  Pennington and Hastie 
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concluded the inferences and the aggregation of the verdicts aided in the forming of a story and 
verdict decision. 
Application of the Story Model to Excuse Defenses  
 There are a number of different aspects to the Pennington and Hastie (1993) theory that 
can be empirically examined, ranging from some of the basic tenants of jurors using previous 
knowledge of the world to each of the individual certainty principles.  The Pennington and 
Hastie model was designed primarily for typical cases in which it is uncertain whether the 
individual committed the crime or not and, as can be expected, some aspects of the theory may 
apply better to excuse defense trials than others.  At the time of this writing, no single study has 
attempted to directly test all aspects of the model with regard to excuse defenses.  However, 
specific parts of the theory have seen some research with regard to different types of excuse 
defenses.  The first aspect I will examine is the claim by the Pennington and Hastie model that 
juror’s decisions are made up not only of the evidence provided in the case, but also of their 
previous knowledge of the world.  This question of the influence of prior knowledge (or biases in 
some cases) has received considerable research. 
 As mentioned above, according to the Pennington and Hastie (1993) story model, jurors 
make decisions based not only on the evidence, but also based on inferences they make from the 
evidence.  These inferences are formed from the juror’s previous views and beliefs about how 
the world works.  Recall from the earlier section that individuals may have some set beliefs that 
they come into the courtroom with regarding how they vi w excuses in general.  It is likely that 
even after the presentation of judicial instructions, many of these general views of excuses will 
persist.  With regard to the specific excuse defenses, the persistence of overall world views has 
been found to be true for the insanity defense in a number of studies.  
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For example, Bailis et al. (1995) presented participants with a vignette in which a 
defendant had committed a crime and was pleading insan ty.  The participants were given a 
direct American Law Institute (ALI) definition for the requirements of a defendant being found 
Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI).  This definit on requires that the defendant be unable 
to fully understand the wrongfulness of or be able to control his/her actions.  The defendant was 
then described as having varying degrees of cognitive and control impairments.  Participants 
were also asked about their attitudes concerning the insanity defense.  As expected, the authors 
found that the degree of impairment had an effect on the participants’ verdicts.  In fact, the 
participants tended to use a more conservative viewpoint, typically requiring both types of 
impairment, rather than just one as the ALI definitio  states.  However, more importantly, the 
authors also found a strong effect of the participants’ previous attitudes, and the authors 
speculated that the attitudes likely moderated the effects of the degree of impairment.  In other 
words, their previous attitudes about the insanity defense altered how they interpreted either the 
evidence or their requirements for the defense.  
In another study by Roberts, Golding, and Fincham (1987), the participants were given 
case summaries of a defendant who had committed murer, but this time they varied the type of 
mental disorder he had (antisocial personality disor er, schizotypal personality disorder, or two 
versions of paranoid schizophrenia), the level of bizarreness of the crime, and the amount of 
planning the defendant had done.  They also included a scale involving participants’ attitudes 
toward the insanity defense.  As expected, the type of mental disorder had a significant impact, 
with the two personality disorders resulting in fewer NGRI verdicts.  However, more 
importantly, the participants’ prior attitudes had a much greater effect.  They furthermore found 
that this effect was related to the participants’ desires for the defendant to be punished regardless 
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of their mental deficit.  Another interesting findig in this study was the strong effect attitude had 
on participants’ choosing Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI) over NGRI.  The authors made the 
claim that it was probable that the participants were coming from a just-world viewpoint, in that 
their personal view of the world required that somene be punished for the wrongful act.  
Participants therefore rejected the NGRI verdict in favor of a verdict where the participant was 
deemed guilty (even if the criteria for the two arein fact very similar). 
A similar study by Roberts and Golding (1991) presented participants with vignettes in 
which a defendant was attempting to utilize an insanity defense.  The authors varied the type of 
delusions the defendant was having, the amount of planning the defendant did before the crime, 
and the type of verdict available (NGRI versus GBMI).  They also included an “attitudes toward 
the insanity defense” scale.  The authors found that the strongest predictor of whether the 
defendant would be acquitted based on NGRI was the participants’ previous attitudes toward the 
insanity defense.  Furthermore, they found that the a titudes themselves altered the way the 
participants viewed the evidence and construed the ot r manipulated variables.  Therefore, the 
participants’ prior attitudes and understandings of what it means to be insane had a stronger 
impact on their understanding of the evidence and thereby their verdicts than any other variable. 
In another study by Finkel and Handel (1989), the researchers were focused on the 
different ways jurors construed evidence to determine their verdicts.  To examine this, the 
authors presented participants with case booklets which included a number of trial vignettes 
where a defendant is pleading the insanity defense.  After reading each vignette, participants 
were asked to render a verdict as well as provide their reasoning for their verdicts.  Following the 
collection of the first set of participants, the researchers then had a separate set of participants 
rate the first group’s reasons.  The researchers found that the jurors’ reasons for choosing their 
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specific verdict were actually quite complex.  They typically gave multiple reasons consisting of 
several different relevant and flexible constructs.  They furthermore found that the participants 
that voted NGRI versus those that voted guilty provided considerably different interpretations of 
the same evidence.  Given that all participants were provided with the exact same cases, it is 
likely that prior attitudes and world knowledge resulted in the participants construing the 
evidence differently. 
As can be seen from the above examples, considerable evidence exists that jurors use 
previous world knowledge and attitudes in how they construe evidence presented in insanity 
defense cases.  However, the insanity defense is not the nly type of excuse defense where this 
phenomenon can be found.  Another example of this can be seen in the study by Heath and 
collegues (2009) mentioned earlier.  They presented jurors with a set of static variables that 
typically should not be considered as evidence in an excuse defense trial: whether the excuse was 
self inflicted or not, the victim’s respectability, and the severity of the assault.  Recall that the 
validity of an excuse defense requires only that the defendant be either mentally impaired or lack 
the capacity to form intent.  None of the three variables mentioned above should have any impact 
on the defendant’s mental impairment or capacity to form intent.  The authors, however, found 
that all three variables had a significant impact on participants’ verdicts.  Participants were more 
likely to accept the PTSD excuse defense over the CCD defense; indicating a prior world view 
that individuals should not be able to use a condition as an excuse that they themselves were 
responsible for causing.  The participants also were more likely to find the defendant not guilty 
when the defendant was more respectable; indicating  previous belief that perhaps the victim 
was more responsible for the assault if he is less r pectable.  Finally, the lower the severity of 
the assault, the more likely the participants were to acquit the defendant.  This indicated a desire 
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to see some form of punishment as the severity of the crime increased regardless of impairment, 
similar to the findings of Robert et al. (1987).  Overall, these variables should not have affected 
the participants’ verdicts if they were coming from a purely legal perspective.  However, the fact 
that the variables do have an effect indicates that the participants are interpreting the evidence 
differently based on previously conceived notions of how the world should work. 
Similar evidence can also be found in research on the entrapment excuse defense.  An 
article by Shaffer and Kerwin (2006) examined the eff ct a juror’s level of dogmatism would 
have on their verdicts.  The authors defined dogmatis  as “how closed-minded a person is” (p. 
1133).  Essentially, individuals high in dogmatism focus on extreme judgments about both 
people and events and have a high respect for authority figures.  Meanwhile, individuals low in 
dogmatism allow for more ambiguity and are less respectful of authority.  The authors 
hypothesized that because individuals high in dogmatis  had a high respect for authority figures, 
they would be more likely to accept the rules set by the judicial instructions; however, this would 
happen only when the extenuating circumstances of the crime were lower.  
To examine this, the authors presented participants with trial booklets in which a 
defendant is accused of drug trafficking after being arrested in a sting operation.  The authors 
manipulated the level of extenuating circumstances and also measured participants’ levels of 
dogmatism.  They found that when given the judicial instructions of entrapment, dogmatic 
participants were significantly more likely to view the defendant in a more positive light, find the 
inducements used by the police as unreasonable, and to accept the entrapment plea.  In other 
words, the participants’ predisposition to accept the word of the supreme authority figure (the 
judge) modified their interpretation of the evidenc (Shaffer & Kerwin, 2006).   
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Finally, recall the previously mentioned study by Peters et al. (2012) that examined juror 
decisions for cases involving a defendant accused of soliciting a minor over the internet who 
pled not guilty by reason of entrapment.  Also examined in the study were participants’ 
attribution of responsibility and due process versus crime control (DPCC) orientation. At this 
point I will examine only the effect participants’ DPCC orientation had on their verdicts, as it is 
the variable most pertinent to the current topic.  Other findings of this study will be discussed 
more in depth in a later section. 
Due process orientation is defined as “a commitment to fairness and egalitarianism in the 
application of the law through the mechanism of procedural regularity (Liu & Shure, 1993, p. 
344).”  Individuals with a due process orientation te d to focus more on protecting the 
constitutional rights of the individual and following the procedural rules set out by the courts 
regarding the collection of evidence and the apprehension of criminals.  Individuals with a crime 
control orientation on the other hand are more concerned with protecting law abiding citizens 
from harm and tend to eschew the procedural rules in favor of putting the criminal in jail.  It was 
expected that jurors with a crime control orientation would be more likely to convict the 
defendant, regardless of who initiated the solicitation or whether the entrapment defense was 
provided.  This is because participants with a crime control orientation would view it as more 
important to remove such dangerous people from society.  Meanwhile, individuals high in due 
process orientation would be more likely to acquit if the rules of due process were violated by 
the agent soliciting first.  The authors found that p rticipants that had a high crime control 
orientation were significantly more likely to provide a guilty verdict, even when the agent 
solicited first (Peters et al., 2012).  Essentially the participants’ prior ideological standpoint 
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affected their verdicts, presumably through altering how they construed either the evidence or the 
judicial instructions.  
A second aspect of the Pennington and Hastie (1993) theory with evidence that can be 
applied to excuse defenses is the certainty principle of Goodness-of-Fit.  Recall that the certainty 
principle of Goodness-of-Fit states that the jurors will assess the possible verdicts available and 
choose the verdict that fits their chosen story.  Evidence for this part of the Pennington and 
Hastie theory can actually be seen in parts of two of the previously mentioned articles: Roberts, 
Golding, and Fincham (1987) and Roberts and Golding (1991).  
 One portion of both studies examined juror verdicts when they were either presented with 
typical NGRI juror instructions or GBMI juror instructions.  Therefore, in this case, jurors were 
given three verdict options: NGRI, GBMI, or just plain guilty (Roberts et al., 1987; Roberts & 
Golding, 1991).  In most cases, there is a very narrow difference between NGRI and GBMI.  For 
example, in the state of Alaska, the only difference in the definitions is that NGRI requires the 
defendant to be “unable” to understand the wrongfulness of their actions, while GBMI only 
requires the defendant to “lack the substantial capa ity” to understand the wrongfulness of their 
actions.  However, in terms of punishment, there is a great deal of difference.  Typically if a 
defendant is found NGRI, they will be civilly committed in a mental institution; however, if the 
defendant is found GBMI, they can receive the full p nishment of the law, as if they were just 
found guilty (Melville & Naimark, 2002).  
In both studies, the authors found that inclusion of the GBMI verdict significantly 
decreased NGRI verdicts, thereby resulting in the def ndant being found guilty.  The authors 
attributed this to the idea that jurors were trying to find a middle ground between needing to 
punish someone for the crime, but not holding them co pletely responsible.  In other words, 
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when the GBMI verdict was available, it fit their construed story better than the NGRI verdict 
(even though the verdicts’ definitions were similar).  Previously, without the GBMI verdict being 
available, they could not match their story to a pure guilty verdict, so defaulted with a not guilty 
verdict. 
Finally, it is likely that some of the other certainty principles would work for excuse 
defenses as well; however, no research has been specifically done to test them.  First, the 
certainty principle of plausibility intuitively seems like it would play a big part in cases where an 
excuse defense is employed.  Consider for example a case where the defendant is pleading 
insanity.  If the defendant’s claim of insanity is not very believable, for instance if just the week 
before he/she was perfectly fine, then the jurors are not likely to rule in the defendant’s favor.  
Likewise, if say in a case of entrapment, the defendant claims to have had no predisposition to 
commit the crime, yet had previously been incarcerated for the same crime, the plausibility of 
their story would decrease, and jurors would be more likely to convict.  A similar concept can be 
seen in the results of Peters et al. (2012).  One possible explanation for why participants were 
significantly less likely to accept the entrapment defense when the defendant solicited first is 
because it is less plausible that the defendant had no predisposition when he was the one that 
initiated the solicitation.  Also, recall from the theory of general excuses section earlier in this 
paper that the plausibility of the excuse had a gret impact both on whether the excuse was 
accepted as well as how the excuser was viewed.  The other certainty principles would likely 
play a similar role as in non-excuse defense trials perhaps to a slightly lesser degree as I shall 
discuss in the next section. 
Weaknesses of the Story Model with Regard to Excuse Defenses 
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 Although the Pennington and Hastie (1993) Story Model does explain a substantial 
portion of jury decision making in excuse defense cases, it does have some weaknesses.  First, as 
mentioned above, although some parts of the theory have been tested in excuse defenses, several 
parts have not.  Even for those aspects that have received some research, the research is sparse 
and is largely limited to the insanity excuse defense.  This is not too surprising given the 
closeness between psychology and the insanity defens ; however, it is possible that what occurs 
in an insanity defense case would be different thanwhat occurs in other types of excuse defense 
cases.  In order to determine if the story model thory can be applied to excuse defenses, 
considerably more research must be done on the other asp cts of the theory.  Also, the research 
needs to be expanded to other excuse defenses such a  entrapment or the intoxication defense, 
rather than just the insanity defense. 
 Secondly, although the Pennington and Hastie (1993) Story Model would seem to be a 
good starting point for understanding the theory behind juror decision making in excuse defense 
cases, it might not be enough to fully explain how jurors make their decisions.  In a typical case, 
jurors are only required to determine whether or not the defendant is the individual who 
committed a specific crime.  In such a case, it makes both intuitive and empirical sense that 
jurors would form stories to aid in their decision making process.  However, in a case where an 
excuse defense is utilized, the jurors are attempting to determine whether the defendant should 
be held responsible for his/her actions.  Although the narrative comprehension and evaluation 
used in the Story Model framework would likely include motives and internal states, the 
Pennington and Hastie model tends not to focus on these types of causal and attributional 
relationships.  Therefore, in the next section I will discuss the potential application of Attribution 




 Attribution Theory is defined as a theory of person perception that “concerns the 
processes through which an individual assigns causes to various responses he makes or observes 
and the consequences of his resulting beliefs about causality” (McArthur, 1972, p. 171).  
Attribution Theory is not a young theory, with some placing its origins dating back to early 
experiments in the 1950s (Gilbert, 1998).  Nor is it a new idea to use Attribution Theory to 
attempt to explain normal jury decision making, though it has fallen out of favor when compared 
to the more cognitive approaches like the Story Model (Penrod & Hastie, 1979).  The purpose of 
this section will be to examine how Attribution Theory can be used to explain jury decision 
making with regard to excuse defenses.  Furthermore, I will attempt to show Attribution Theory 
complements aspects of the previously mentioned two models and is a necessary addition to the 
overall framework. 
 To accomplish this goal, I will begin by providing a brief history of attribution, including 
how it has transformed over the years.  I shall follow the overall history with an in depth 
discussion of Kelley’s ANOVA model, which has particular pertinence to excuse defenses.  Next 
I will discuss some of the literature that has applied Attribution Theory to jury decision making, 
as well as the few studies that have used Attribution Theory when explaining an excuse defense.  
Finally, I will conclude this section by focusing on how Attribution Theory can be integrated 
with the two previously mentioned theories to provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
the topic at hand. 
History of Attribution Theory 
  As with any major area of science, there are of course some differing opinions 
concerning where Attribution Theory originated from and, considering it’s a psychological 
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theory, many would place its origins somewhere in ancient Greek times.  However, Aristotle 
aside, most historians would view the formal father of Attribution Theory to be Fritz Heider 
(Gilbert, 1998).  Although most of his writing invol ed more formal theorizing than 
experimental manipulation, in his book, Heider (1958) set in motion some of the very basic 
tenants of Attribution Theory.  
Heider based much of his theory on an analogy with object perception.  Put simply, when 
an individual views an object, his visual system automatically separates the experience into two 
sets of information: stable dispositions and transie t situations.  Dispositions are those 
characteristics of the object that the perceptual system always understands are inherent in the 
object, for example, that a ball is always round.  The situational experiences, however, may vary 
depending on the external situation, for example say the direction an individual is viewing the 
ball from causes it to look oval shaped instead of round (Heider, 1958).  
Heider (1958) theorized that humans view other individuals’ actions in a similar fashion, 
as having both internal dispositions of the person and external dispositions of the environment.  
Our attribution skill then works by unconsciously ‘extracting’ the more invariable internal 
dispositions from their highly variable behaviors.  According to Heider, individuals use their 
attribution system to examine behavior in terms of the interaction between “capacity” and 
“motivation”.  In other words, the individual must be able to perform the behavior, and the 
individual must be willing to perform the behavior.  Capacity in turn can be broken down to 
dispositional factors of ability or skills, as well as external factors in the environment that may 
limit or aid the individual.  Motivation on the other hand is based on the individual’s intention 
and effort.  Using these different aspects, the attribution system determines which behaviors to 
equate to internal dispositions versus external situational factors.  For example, consider a 
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defendant arrested in a drug sting operation.  Two different factors may exist, the external factor 
of the sting operation which provided him the opportunity to sell the drugs, and the internal 
dispositional factor of being a drug dealer who would typically have sold the drugs regardless.  
Deciding which one is more in line with that particular situation could determine the verdict a 
jury chooses.  
Heider’s version of Attribution Theory was not well accepted in the scientific community 
due to its complexity and its attempts to cover too much breadth (Gilbert, 1998).  To remedy this 
problem, another pair of researchers, Jones and Davis (1965), proposed their theory of 
Correspondent Inferences.  Instead of the global views of Heider, Correspondent Inferences 
focused specifically on the rules the attribution system follows to determine the intentions 
another individual had when making a decision.  In other words, they wanted to know how 
people determine the goals of a specific actor, as well as what that gained information tells them 
about the actor.  According to Jones and Davis, the obs rver focuses on the amount of unique 
consequences available to the actor, as well as the basic desirability of those actions. 
When an individual makes a decision, they do so from a number of options that may have 
qualities in common with each other, as well as qualities that are unique.  According to Jones and 
Davis (1965), individuals can only infer intention based on the unique qualities of a choice.  For 
example, say a boy can choose from a set of three identical balls, one of which is blue, one of 
which is red, and one of which is green.  If the boy chooses the blue ball, one cannot infer that 
the boy intended to choose something round, because all the balls were round.  However, you 
could potentially infer that the boy intended to choose blue over the other two colors, because the 
color was unique.  Jones and Davis referred to these unique qualities as “noncommon effects”.  
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However, a problem occurs when more than one noncommon effect exists.  In such a 
case, the observer is unable to determine with absolute certainty what the intention of the actor 
is.  At this juncture, the observer relies on the social desirability of the potential options.  In other 
words, it is unlikely that an individual would seek out a negative consequence; the positive 
consequence is the one the actor most likely intended to gain.  For example, if an individual gets 
intoxicated at a party, it is unlikely that their goal is a hangover or liver disease.  A more likely 
intention would be the desirable positive effects of being more sociable and having a good time 
(Jones & Davis, 1965). 
Lastly, Jones and Davis (1965) made the assertion that for the most part, people are not 
concerned with “common” intentions, but rather extraordinary ones.  If the specific actor’s 
intention is one that nearly everyone would have, th n it does not tell others anything about the 
person, other than perhaps they are normal.  Instead, individuals want to know what about that 
person is different.  For example, consider a store clerk who is being held at gunpoint by a thief.  
If the clerk hands over the money, it can be inferred that he did this with the intent of staying 
alive.  Unfortunately for the observer, this is rather unextraordinary since most people have the 
desire to stay alive.  However, if the clerk refuses to hand over the money on the account that he 
is unafraid of being shot, it can instead be inferred that he is a rather courageous man in the face 
of danger.  This is a more unusual decision and tells much more about the individual.  Jones and 
Davis referred to this phenomenon as the “correspondent inference”.  Jones and Davis’s 
additions to Attribution Theory were highly useful, but the theory was still not complete. 
Following Jones and Davis, another researcher, Harold Kelley, greatly expanded 
Attribution Theory in a way that catered well to the views of other scientists (Gilbert, 1998).  
Kelley (1971) made the claim that essentially normal individuals determine another persons’ 
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disposition in the same way that scientists determine things in research: through “causal 
analysis”.  According to Kelley, to infer whether one thing caused another, an individual focuses 
on the covariation between causes and effects, which he referred to as the “covariation 
principle”.  Following the covariation principle, observers focused on three rules or properties of 
the events to help them determine whether a behavior was caused by an individuals’ disposition 
or some outside force beyond their control: consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus. 
A specific behavior is shown to be consistent if itoccurs the majority of the time, for 
example, “James frequently skips his Psychology class”.  A behavior is shown to be distinctive if 
it occurs in more than just the one situation: “James also frequently skips History class”.  Finally, 
the behavior is seen as lacking consensus if it can be shown to be different from how other 
individuals would act: “Daniel and Robert do not skip Psychology class”.  If all three rules are 
satisfied, then according to Kelley (1971), it can be inferred that the behavior is the result of an 
internal disposition of the actor and is “worth discovering”.  
The second part of Kelley’s (1971) theory involved the “discounting principle” which 
focused on the concept that when more than one potential cause is available, the certainty that 
any one of them is the actual cause is weakened.  In other words, if there is more than one 
plausible explanation for the behavior, it is more difficult to attribute that behavior to the 
disposition of the actor.  Finally, the third addition of Kelley was the expansion of the term 
situation.  In previous versions of Attribution Theory, situation referred rather strictly to some 
external force in nature, for example a strong current preventing a swimmer from crossing a 
stream.  However, Kelley expanded situation to include external influences on an individual’s 
capacity as well as influences on their motivation.  The influence of motivation is a rather broad 
conceptualization in that it could even allow for ce tain factors that are inside of the actor.  For 
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example, under Kelley’s interpretation, a situational cause could even include things like being 
intoxicated or having a mental breakdown.  
Given the centrality of Kelley’s (1971) model to Attribution Theory, it would seem 
prudent to examine one of the primary bodies of evid nce for the model: a study by McArthur 
(1972).  McArthur attempted to validate and expand Kelley’s model by examining the effects of 
Kelley’s information sources on the attributions made by participants in different circumstances.  
To accomplish this, she manipulated the levels of distinctiveness, consensus, and consistency, 
and asked participants to make either a person, a stimulus, or a circumstance attribution.  She 
also asked participants to indicate what type of future actions the actor was likely to take. 
Given the multitude of variables, not surprisingly the author had a number of different 
findings (McArthur, 1972).  First, she found a specific pattern for each of the three attributions.  
Essentially, when consensus and distinctiveness information were low, but consistency 
information was high, the participant was most likely to make an attribution to the person.  In 
other words, the participant was more likely to attribute an action to something inherent in the 
individual when others typically would not have behaved in the same way, the actor acts the 
same toward other stimuli, and the actor acts the same way to the same situation.  Meanwhile, 
the participant was most likely to make a stimulus attribution when all three sources of 
information were high.  So, when the actor would have cted the same toward the same stimulus, 
but differently to other stimuli, and others would have acted the same way to said stimulus, the 
participants attributed the cause to something inherent in the stimulus.  Finally, participants were 
most likely to make a circumstance attribution when distinctiveness was high, but consistency 
was low.  Participants were likely to attribute theaction to the specific circumstances if the actor 
would not have acted the same way to either the same or other stimuli.  
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McArthur (1972) also made an important observation.  Using her findings, it was 
possible to determine which type of information hasthe strongest effect on each of the three 
attributions.  She found that distinctiveness information has the greatest effect on whether an 
individual will make a person (low distinctiveness) or stimulus (high distinctiveness) attribution.  
Meanwhile, if one wished to evoke a circumstance attribution, then pieces of consistency 
information are the most important to manipulate.  This is useful if one is considering attempting 
to alter some observer’s attribution of responsibility for an action.  If there is limited time and/or 
information available, then focusing on the specific information for the desired attribution would 
be helpful.  For example, consider an individual tht pleads entrapment to a drug trafficking 
charge.  If the defense wishes to convey that it was in fact the circumstances of the sting 
operation that caused the defendant to purchase the drugs, then it would be most helpful if they 
could show a lack of previous drug purchasing behaviors.  
McArthur (1972) also found that the different types of information had a significant 
effect on what the participants expected the actor to do in the future.  Participants’ likelihood to 
generalize the actors’ behaviors to other stimuli was greater for low consensus and distinction.  
The author explained this by stating that given that consensus indicates the behavior originated in 
the actor, which means “he is an emitter of that response which suggests that he will emit it in 
the presence of other stimuli as well” (p. 189).  Meanwhile, high consensus and distinction was 
associated with the expectation that the actor would make different responses to the same 
stimuli, rather than the same reaction to different stimuli.  This is important once again if 
considered from a legal standpoint.  One potential go of the justice system would be crime 
control.  If a juror (particularly one with a crime control orientation) believes a defendant is 
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likely to commit another crime in the future, he/she is potentially more likely to render a guilty 
verdict (Liu & Shure, 1993).  
Application to Excuse Defenses 
Overall, Attribution Theory provides a number of con epts to help better understand how 
jurors may make decisions in cases involving excuse def nses.  The first area that can be applied 
is Heider’s (1958) separation of internal versus external.  With excuse defenses, essentially the 
juror is trying to decide if the defendant’s actions were caused by something internal in the 
individual or if it were some sort of external cause.  Jones and Davis (1965) extended Heider’s 
Attribution Theory to focus mainly on how people determine intentionality.  It is not just an 
internal cause the jurors are looking for, but rather t e intentions of the defendant.  Recall from 
the definition of a crime mentioned earlier, a defendant must have both actus rea and mens rea.  
Attribution Theory may be the method jurors use to determine if a defendant had mens rea.  
Another application specifically from Jones and Davis can be seen in the entrapment defense.  
According to the Jones and Davis model, only intentions that are different from the intentions 
everyone else would make provide the observer with information about the internal dispositions 
of the actor.  In the entrapment defense, this is similar to the requirement that the undercover 
agents’ actions would have swayed the average individual to do the same thing.  In other words, 
if the inducements used by the agent were so strong hat the normative behavior would have been 
to accept them, then the jury member cannot infer a criminal intent on the part of the defendant. 
Finally, Kelley (1971) and McArthur (1972) provided a number of more specific ways in 
which individuals could determine intentionality.  I will now examine how each of them could 
work in a jury setting.  First, it is likely that Kelley’s covariation principle is something akin to 
how jurors examine different pieces of evidence in an excuse defense trial.  Each piece of 
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evidence that is related to whether or not the defendant possessed mens rea has additive or 
negative strength toward determining the defendant’s guilt.  Kelley also helped by expanding 
potential non-dispositional causes to forces not just limited to the external environment.  For 
example, even though a disorder like schizophrenia xists within the individual, it could still be 
considered non-dispositional cause, due to the fact th t it removed the defendant’s ability to act 
in a truly intentional way.  Finally, it is also likely, that the trial evidence provided could be 
specifically applied to the three proprieties Kelley proposed: consistency, distinctiveness, and 
consensus.  
First, let us consider consistency.  Recall that consistency refers to the idea that the actor 
is likely to perform the same action toward the same target every time (Kelley, 1971).  From a 
legal standpoint, the defendant will commit the same crime toward the same type of victim each 
time.  This actually has two potential applications to juror decisions in excuse defenses.  Firstly, 
if the defendant had committed the same crime in the past, it is unlikely that they were unable to 
form intent every time and the jury is likely to find in favor of the prosecution.  This is especially 
true in the context of entrapment where consistency could be a strong indicator of predisposition.  
Secondly, consistency could also have a possible detrimental effect toward the defendant during 
the sentencing phase.  If the jurors have made an internal attribution toward the defendant, in line 
with consistency, they are likely to believe the defendant will commit the crime again in the 
future if given the opportunity.  Therefore, in orde  to prevent this, they may impose a harsher 
sentence, particularly if they have a strong Crime Control Orientation (Liu & Shure, 1993). 
Given its similar focus on the actor, distinctiveness too can be applied to excuse defenses.  
Once again, distinctiveness refers to the actor performing the same behavior, but towards 
different targets (Kelley, 1971).  Distinctiveness could have a number of different applications, 
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depending on the type of crime and could have either a positive or negative effect on the 
defense’s case.  Consider a trial in which the defendant is pleading insanity to a charge of 
assault.  If the defendant has a history of going into uncontrollable rage and attacking others 
because they are schizophrenic, then it is likely the defense will succeed.  However, consider 
different circumstances.  Say a defendant is attempting to plead entrapment to a drug trafficking 
charge.  The defendant has never been arrested for drug trafficking, but has been arrested for a 
number of other crimes, indicating a tendency for lawbreaking behavior.  In this case, the 
defense is unlikely to be successful. 
Finally, consensus has potentially the most impact on excuse defenses, especially the 
entrapment defense.  Recall that consensus refers to the fact that individuals other than the 
defendant would have acted in the same way to toward the same object or situation (Kelley, 
1971).  This is a direct parallel to the entrapment defense’s concept that the police had acted in 
such a way that it would have convinced the average l w abiding citizen, rather than just the 
average criminal.  This could, however, be one of the hardest to convince a jury member of.  
Given that most jury members are “average law abiding c tizens” (or at least are supposed to be), 
they are likely to attempt to compare the defendant to themselves.  Furthermore, given the high 
likelihood of a self-serving bias (Heider, 1958) on the part of the juror, they are unlikely to 
believe they would have acted in such a criminal fashion. 
Given the closeness to the definition of excuse defnses, it may even be possible to apply 
McArthur’s (1972) findings of which information combinations result in different attribution 
types.  For example, given that the defense would most likely desire a situational attribution from 
the jury, the defense attorney should present the evidence in such a way as to make all three 
categories of information as being high.  Furthermore, since distinctiveness seemed to have the 
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strongest effect, they could focus most on evidence supporting claims that the defendant’s 
actions were highly distinct to the one situation.  However, this application is purely speculation 
based on McArthur’s findings, and no research has been done to attempt to prove its validity yet.  
Empirical Evidence 
 Although no research has explicitly tested different aspects of Attribution Theory to jury 
decisions, a number of studies have made a more general application of the theory in the form of 
attribution of responsibility.  Some of these studies have already been discussed in the previous 
theoretical section in detail; therefore, only results directly related to Attribution Theory will be 
discussed here. 
Recall the Roberts et al. (1987) and Roberts and Gol ing (1991) studies on the 
differences between NGRI and GBMI verdicts.  Although the focus of both studies was 
primarily on how the jurors’ previous biases and construals of evidence affected their verdicts, 
they both also included an attribution of responsibility scale.  Roberts et al. found that in addition 
to previous biases, attribution of responsibility had a direct effect on the participants’ construals, 
which in turn affected their verdicts.  Roberts and Golding expanded on this notion by finding 
that construals related to attribution of responsibility predicted verdicts far better than the 
primary design variables within the study.  They speculated that the attributions of responsibility 
construals were mediated by the participants’ biases toward the insanity defense, which resulted 
in how the juror decided to vote. 
Also, again recall Peters et al. (2012) from the previous theoretical section.  In their 
study, participants found the defendant not guilty significantly more often when the agent 
solicited the defendant first than when the defendant id the soliciting.  Participants’ attributions 
of responsibility toward the defendant were also asses ed in this study.  Attribution of 
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responsibility was a highly significant predictor of juror verdicts.  More importantly, the 
participants’ attributions were shown to be a signif cant mediator of the effect of who solicited 
first.  In other words, attribution not only was a critical part of the jury decision making process, 
it also mediated the effects of the evidentiary variables presented in this study. 
A similar study by Roberts, Sargent, and Chan (1993) once again examined differences in 
NGRI and GBMI verdicts, but this time only presented participants with a vignette involving a 
stereotypical legally insane defendant.  The defendant was highly psychotic with delusions that 
the victim of a homicide was attempting to kill him, as well as accompanying auditory 
hallucinations that increased the strength of the delusions.  He was also described as having a 
long history of psychotic tendencies.  Diagnostic and expert opinions were omitted from the 
vignette to enable participants to decide on their own whether the defendant was legally insane 
or not.  Overall, the authors found that participants who voted GBMI had significantly different 
construals than participants who voted NGRI.  The addition of the GMBI option did not have a 
direct effect on verdict choices, but rather affected the attribution of blame thresholds.  When the 
GBMI option was provided, those that voted GBMI had considerably higher thresholds of 
attribution of blame and responsibility for the defendant to have been found not guilty.  In other 
words, it was the participants’ attribution of blame and responsibility that resulted in participants 
making different verdict decisions. 
Dunn, Cowan, and Downs (2006) performed a study to determine the effects a 
defendant’s sex and race would have on juror decisions in a filicide case.  Filicide refers to the 
murdering of one’s own biological child by a parent.  Given the extreme nature of the act, it is 
not uncommon for the defendant in these cases to have a severe psychological disorder (Sadoff, 
1995).  The authors presented the participants with a trial in which a parent murdered their 
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children either by smothering them with a pillow or shooting them with a handgun.  They also 
manipulated whether the parent was Caucasian or African American and whether it was the 
father or mother.  Dunn et al. hypothesized that participants would be less likely to vote NGRI 
for the cases that were contrary to stereotypes of gender and race.  This was based on Attribution 
Theory’s (Jones and Davis, 1965) claim that unique acts are more likely to result in dispositional 
attributions (and therefore guilty verdicts). 
Dunn et al. (2006) found support for their hypothesis regarding gender.  Males were 
judged harsher when they smothered their children, and women were judged in a harsher manner 
when they used a gun.  This is in line with the stereotype that males are more likely to murder 
their children with weapons, while females are more lik ly to murder their children by cutting off 
their air supply (Lewis, Baranoski, Buchanan, & Benedek, 1998).  No effects were found, 
however, for race.  The authors speculated that the gender stereotype was stronger than racial 
stereotypes for filicide; however, more research would be needed to support this claim.  Overall, 
although the results’ connection to Attribution Theory is limited at best, it is the only article to be
found that examined a specific part of Attribution Theory as it relates to excuse defenses. 
Heath, Stone, Darley, and Grannemann (2003) examined juror perceptions of a variety of 
different excuse defenses.  The excuses were divide based on origin into three distinct 
categories: Biological, Environmental, and Psychological.  Biologically based excuses included a 
variety of genetic excuses, for example XXY syndrome.  Environmental excuses were far more 
varied, including everything from consumable substances to childhood events to television 
violence.  Psychological excuses were based primarily in nsanity pleas and included disorders 
such as schizophrenia and dissociative identity disor er.  Participants were presented with a case 
in which a defendant is accused of assault and battery, but is pleading not guilty by reason of 
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some excuse defense.  Following the short vignette, participants were asked to rate 15 different 
excuse defenses based on their credibility, persuasiveness, responsibility of the defendant, and 
they were asked to provide a verdict and sentence recommendation. 
The authors found that the credibility and persuasiveness of each excuse defense was 
correlated with the amount of responsibility participants attributed to the defendant (Heath et al., 
2003).  The more credible each excuse was, the morepersuasive it was, and the less 
responsibility the participants attributed to the defendant.  Also, the less control the participant 
was deemed to have over his actions, the less responsibility the participants attributed to him.  
Overall, when the defendant was attributed as having less control and responsibility, the 
participants were significantly more likely to find him not guilty and to recommend lower 
sentences.  This study indicated that if the excuse was believable and persuasive, participants 
were less likely to make a dispositional attribution n both control and responsibility.  
Furthermore, this dispositional attribution predicted both verdicts and recommended sentences.    
Finally, Heath, Grannemann, Peacock, and Dulyx (2001) presented participants with a 
trial in which a defendant is accused of assaulting a other individual, but provides an excuse as 
to why he is not guilty.  The authors manipulated the self-inflictedness of the defendant’s excuse, 
as well as whether or not the victim was partially responsible for the cause of the excuse.  The 
authors found that the more self-inflicted the impairment that the defendant attempted to use as 
an excuse defense, the more the participants attributed blame for the crime to the defendant.  In 
turn, defendants who were attributed less responsibility for the crime had significantly fewer 
guilty verdicts.  Furthermore, if the victim was parti lly to blame for the crime, participants 
voted guilty less often, as well.  The authors concluded that when some of the attribution of 
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responsibility could be shifted to either an excuse or another individual, the excuse defense is 
more likely to be successful.   
Limitations 
 As can be seen, overall, there are several ways in which Attribution Theory could be 
applied; however, Attribution Theory is also insufficient, on its own, to fully explain jury 
decision making in excuse defenses.  First, althoug attribution can work to explain the final 
parts of how jurors determine a defendant’s intentions, it is unable to explain the process or how 
the jurors organize all the evidence to aid them in their attributions.  The way the legal system is 
organized can create a particularly difficult scenario for jurors to make a coherent attribution.  
They must take evidence from two competing sides, often which disagree with each other.  
Furthermore, they may receive all sorts of evidence from a variety of sources which they must 
make sense of.  On top of that, the juror’s attribuion is extremely important as it can determine 
whether or not the defendant’s freedom is taken away from them.  
Secondly, Attribution Theory fails to take into account the different legal statutes and 
judicial instructions that are provided to the juror.  Although some of the instructions seem to 
parallel Attribution Theory, others may not, and such instructions could alter how the juror 
makes their attribution.  Finally, Attribution Theory is for the most part applicable to only a 
single person making an attribution.  In the courtroom, however, there are (typically) 12 jurors 
who deliberate and this may alter how those attributions result in a verdict.  That being said, 
Attribution Theory can be used at least with predeliberation jurors to help determine what 
attribution decisions they bring with them to the deliberation table. 
Comprehensive Theory of Jury Decision Making for Excuse Defenses 
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 In the previous sections, I reviewed three different theories that can be used to help 
explain jury decision making in excuse defense trials.  First, I examined how excuses were 
viewed generally in everyday life (Schlenker, 1985).  Second, I reviewed Pennington and 
Hastie’s (1993) Story Model which attempts to explain jury decision making for traditional 
defenses.  Finally, I considered Attribution Theory (Heider, 1958) in the context of excuse 
defenses.  Although each of these theories can contribute individually to the understanding of 
juror decisions in excuse defense trials, they alsol have significant limitations as mentioned 
above.  The goal of the next section is to recognize some of the major similarities between the 
three theories and create a potential conglomerate theory that better explains excuse defenses. 
Similarities Between the Theories 
 Even though there are considerable differences between the three theories, there are a 
number of similarities between them as well.  On the surface, the most obvious similarity 
between the three theories involves the typically used methodologies to study them.  In all three 
cases, the methodology almost exclusively involves having the participant either reading a mock 
scenario or visualizing a potential situation and attempting to imagine how they would react to it.  
This is not unexpected in any literature that specifically involves jury verdicts given the 
difficulty of creating a realistic juror situation; however, a few of the methods utilized in the 
general excuses literature were more creative (i.e. Weiner et al., 1987).  It may be possible to 
adapt some of the methods from the general excuses model to the actual jury setting and improve 
the external validity of the research. 
Another major similarity across all three theories is the importance of the believability of 
the excuse.  Believability is typically referred to as plausibility, one of the governing aspects of 
coherence in the Pennington and Hastie (1993) Story M del.   Believability was also seen as 
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important in the context of general excuses.  If individuals lacked corroborative evidence for an 
excuse, or if evidence existed that was contrary to the excuse's claim, the excuse proved 
ineffective and the excuser was viewed in a more negative light (Pontari et al., 2002).  
Participants also felt more negative emotions and had more negative views of the excuser when 
excuses were perceived as inadequate and insincere (Bi s, Shapiro, & Cummings, 1988).  The 
believability of the excuse defense was also seen to impact the participant's attributions of 
responsibility and verdicts (Heath et al., 2003).  The more credible the excuse defense, the less 
responsibility was attributed to the defendant.  It makes sense that how much the receiver of an 
excuse believes what they are being told has a major impact on their willingness to accept the 
excuse, regardless of whether they are in courtroom, at work, or just walking down the street.  
Therefore, the believability of the excuse defense is likely at the core of juror decision making in 
excuse defenses.  In fact, it is entirely possible that believability must be established in an excuse 
defense before any other consideration on the part of the juror may occur.  That being said, there 
are other important similarities between the three theories. 
There are a couple of important similarities between how excuse defenses are viewed in 
general (Schlenker, 1985) and the Pennington and Hastie (1993) Story Model.  First, the 
certainty principle of coverage in the story model refers to how well the pieces of evidence are 
integrated into each side's story.  The more evidence that is represented in the story, the better 
that side's story is perceived and the more likely it is to be selected.  This is similar to an aspect 
of general excuses where the adequacy to fully explain their reasons predicted the emotional 
reaction of the individual (Bies, Shapiro, & Cummings, 1988).  It makes intuitive sense that 
being able to better explain events would improve how individuals view an explanation, 
regardless of whether that explanation takes place in the courtroom or real life.  This also makes 
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sense with regard to excuse defenses.  In a normal t ial, the coverage of each of the pieces of 
evidence influences how the jury decides.  In an excuse defense case, the excuse itself and the 
rationale the defendant provides in support of that excuse become the evidence.  Essentially by 
providing an adequate excuse, the defense is satisfying the coverage component of the Story 
Model. 
The second similarity between general excuses and the Story Model revolves around the 
concept of completeness, a critical component of the certainty principle of coherence.  
Completeness refers to whether claims made by one st ry are actually represented in the 
evidence (Pennington & Hastie, 1993).  This is similar to a finding in the general excuse 
literature referring to the lack of corroborating iformation or the presence of contrary 
information.  Participants who lacked collaborative information in support of their excuse were 
looked upon more poorly and suffered worse punishments than those who had corroborating 
information (Pontari et al., 2002).  This once again makes intuitive sense concerning excuse 
defenses if considering the supporting information of the excuse defense as evidence.  If that 
evidence fails to match the claims the defendant is try ng to make, it would obviously greatly 
decrease the effectiveness of the defense. 
There is also a major similarity that exists between the general excuse literatures 
(Schlenker, 1985) and Attribution Theory (Heider, 1958).  This similarity is based on how 
individuals view certain behaviors as internal verses external.  In the general excuse literature, 
individuals who used internalizing excuses (Weiner et al., 1987; Wallis & Kleinke, 1995) were 
viewed in a more negative fashion.  Similarly, indivi uals whose act was obviously intentional or 
their excuse was self-inflicted (Smith & Strube, 199 ) had less success with their excuses.  This 
is similar to the attribution literature with regard to excuse defenses, where internal or self-
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inflicted excuse defenses were less effective at swying juries (Heath et al., 2003).  This is a 
critical similarity when one considers the centraliy of intention to Attribution Theory (Kelley, 
1971).  Essentially, even though the general excuse literature does not explicitly mention 
Attribution Theory, the connection could be made that a significant predictor of whether an 
excuse will be accepted in general is based on how t e receiver of the excuse attributes intention 
for the action.  This in turn could help to explain why or why not an excuse defense is effective 
in the courtroom.  
The final major similarity is between Attribution Theory (Kelley, 1971) and Pennington 
and Hastie’s (1993) Story Model. In Kelley’s model of Attribution Theory, one of the primary 
concepts was the “discounting principle” which stated hat if more than one potential cause for 
an event exists, the certainty that any one of them is the actual cause is weakened.  This is very 
similar to the Story Model's certainty principle of uniqueness that says a juror's confidence in a 
side's story weakens if the other story is able to xplain the evidence just as well.  This is 
important if you again look at a defendant's rationale for their excuse as evidence.  If their 
rationale helps to create a strong second story for thei  actions, then the act is less likely to be 
attributed to the defendant and the excuse defense is more likely to be successful.  
Overall, there are a number of important similarities between the three divergent theories.  
Although other similarities may exist, the ones listed above are the similarities I deemed most 
important.  With them, I can begin to create a comprehensive theory to better explain juror 
decision making in excuse defense cases.  The following section is an attempt to create such a 
theory, by combining aspects of the three previously mentioned theories, with some focus on 
their similarities. 
A Combined Theory 
56 
 
 To create a combined theory of jury decision making for excuse defenses, it makes sense 
to use Pennington and Hastie’s (1993) Story Model as a basis for my new theory.  In a case 
where an excuse defense is utilized, it is highly likely that jurors go through much of the same 
processes as in a typical criminal trial.  As in the Story Model, jurors will create each side’s story 
using their previous world knowledge to make inferences about the evidence.  Then the jurors 
will use the previously mentioned certainty principles to evaluate each story.  In essence, the 
current theory is an extension of the Story Model to adapt it specifically for the special 
circumstances involved in an excuse defense case.  That being said, I will now walk through the 
parts of the Story Model as applied to these types of cases. 
 As previously mentioned, one of the critical components of the Story Model is that jurors 
evaluate not only the provided evidence, but use previous world views and experiences to make 
their decisions.  Much of the primary evidence thatis entered in a case where an excuse defense 
is utilized will revolve around the excuse itself, rather than direct physical evidence as in a 
typical case.  As such, this evidence will be focused on determining the defendant’s ability to 
form intent.  The defense will present evidence attmpting to show the defendant was unable to 
form intent, while the prosecution will attempt to refute those claims by showing the defendant 
did in fact intend to commit the crime.  It is likely that the other two previously covered research 
areas (general excuses and Attribution Theory), play a critical part.  In other words, jurors bring 
their general views of excuses and determining intent of actions with them to the courtroom to 
help them make sense of the excuse evidence. 
 In terms of the general excuses theories, jurors will have a preconceived notion regarding 
how to evaluate excuses.  Jurors will view the excuse defense in a positive light if they view it as 
sincere and believable (Bies et al., 1988).  The excuses will also be evaluated in terms of the 
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intentionality of the act.  When an act is viewed as intentional, the excuse is less successful and 
in fact results in an even more negative view of the person attempting the excuse (Ohbuch & 
Sato, 1993; Rhodewalt et al., 1995).  This is ironically circular given that the driving force of an 
excuse defense is determining the defendant's intent.  The findings in the general excuses 
literature would seem to imply that by attempting a excuse defense in which the defendant's 
intent is at question, the defendant is potentially risking a more negative reaction if his or her 
excuse is not accepted.  This in turn could result in harsher punishment recommendations by the 
jurors than if the defendant had simply pled guilty.  This focus on intent also brings us to the 
second set of information that a juror will bring with them: how to determine the intentions of an 
actor. 
 As previously mentioned, the primary method through which an individual determines 
the intentionality of another individual’s actions can be explained using Attribution Theory 
(Heider, 1958).  According to Kelley (1971), individuals use the covariation principle to 
determine the intentionality of an actor's behavior.  One would imagine that jurors would 
maintain this view that it is possible to determine an individual's intent by examining the 
consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus of the action.  As such, it is likely that the jurors will 
organize the presented evidence as it applies to one of the three properties.  Furthermore, the 
findings of McArthur (1972) indicate that it is possible to determine which property has the 
greatest effect on the type of attribution the individual will make.  Jurors will bring this same sort 
of weighing criteria to the courtroom.  For example, evidence that points to high distinctiveness 
of the act will likely aid the defense more than evid nce that portrays the act as highly consistent. 
 The second major part of the Pennington and Hastie (1993) Story Model consists of the 
four certainty principles of Coverage, Coherence, Uniqueness, and Goodness-of-Fit. These 
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certainty principles will most definitely still apply to excuse defenses; however, I propose a fifth 
principle: attribution of responsibility.  The attribution of responsibility principle includes 
aspects from both the Attribution Theory (Kelley, 197 ) literature concerning how to attribute 
the intent of the actor’s behaviors, as well as from the general excuses literatures, with regard to 
how the excuses themselves are evaluated.  
Jurors would assess the attribution of responsibility after creating their stories using the 
principles of Coverage, Coherence, and Uniqueness, but prior to assessing the chosen story for 
Goodness-of-Fit.  It is necessary for the jurors to evaluate the stories formed for each side first, 
because pieces of the first three principles contain important aspects of the other two theories 
concerning how the excuses are evaluated and the attributions are made.  Essentially, the 
attribution of responsibility principle is added specifically to evaluate the evidence against or in 
favor of the excuses.  For example, the plausibility aspect of the Coherence principle would have 
a major impact on whether the juror believes and accepts the evidence in favor (or against) the 
excuse.  Also, it makes sense that the jurors would attempt to determine the attribution of 
responsibility of the defendant before determining the Goodness-of-Fit, because the juror’s 
verdict choice should be based on the intent of the def ndant.  It would be possible for a story to 
be selected based on its overall Coverage, Coherenc, a d Uniqueness, but still fail to influence 
the verdict choice.  For example, say the juror selects the defense’s story because the evidence 
flows together better, it explains the evidence better, and seems more reliable overall.  However, 
even though it may be better than the prosecution’s story, if it fails to prove that the defendant 
was unable to form intent, then the juror will still find the defendant guilty. 
Finally, the juror will use the principle of Goodness-of-Fit to compare the story to the 
available verdict choices to make their decision.  There is one difference in this section however. 
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The Goodness-of-Fit in a typical trial favors the defendant because if they cannot match well to a 
verdict choice, they must choose the default, which is not guilty.  In an excuse defense trial, 
however, this same principle could work against the defendant due to the affirmative nature of 
the defense.  Since the burden of proof is now on the defendant, the default choice becomes 
guilty.  Therefore, if the juror fails to find a verdict match, they should revert back to finding the 
defendant guilty, instead of not guilty. 
Overall, much of the above theory is still highly speculative.  Therefore, it is necessary 
for a great deal of research to be done to better evaluate the postulated theory.  The next section 
includes two experiments that were done to help test th  validity of the aforementioned theory. 
The Current Research 
 As can be seen, although some research has been don  on excuse defenses, the focus has 
been almost exclusively on verdicts and opinions rather than on exploring theoretical 
explanations for juror decisions.  The goal of the current research is to empirically examine how 
the current Attribution (Experiments 1 & 2) and Story Model theories (Experiment 2) may relate 
to jury decision making for different excuse defenses.  To this end, two types of excuse defenses 
were chosen: Entrapment and Brain Damage (a variant of i sanity).  These two defenses were 
chosen for two reasons.  First, they have both recently received a fair amount of media coverage 
as utilized defenses in actual cases.  Second, they actually represent two separate areas for the 
origin of the excuse.  As previously mentioned, a core component of the excuse defense is 
whether the criminal act is perceived as being intentional or not.  When an excuse defense is 
being utilized, the defendant is claiming that something interfered with his or her ability to form 
said intent.  When an entrapment defense is utilized, the source of the interference is the actions 
of the undercover agent, which is clearly something external.  As a result, it is not hard to see 
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why a juror would be making an external situational attribution if they were to accept the excuse 
defense.  With a brain damage defense on the other hand, the claim is not that some cause 
external to the person instigated their engagement in the wrongful action.  Rather, the defense 
claims that the actions of the individual are due to some internal disposition or cause, but the 
normal functioning of these internal mechanisms has been impaired such that they do not reflect 
the true nature of the individual.  This discrepancy may potentially be explained using folk 
psychological theories regarding the persistence of the self, particularly views of psychological 
essentialism as applied to the self (Lampinen et al., 2004). 
 A study by Lampinen and colleagues (2004) presented participants with a variety of 
scenarios in which something was altered about an individual.  These scenarios ranged 
everywhere from amnesia to limb amputation to brain tra splants.  The authors found that in a 
number of circumstances the participants believed th  ‘self’ persisted.  There was considerable 
variability; however, depending on the changes, for example bodily continuity seemed 
particularly important.  Loss of memory seemed important, but not as important as changes to 
personality.   
 Overall, even though the specific case of brain damage used in the current studies was not 
examined, the Lampinen et al. (2004) study provides evidence that laypersons may view a 
persistence of self, separate from changes even to the brain.  This in turn led to the following 
predictions: 1) Attribution Theory would significantly impact participants’ decisions regarding 
the guilt of the defendant.  2) The way Attribution Theory has an impact would differ depending 
on the type of excuse defense such that for the entrapment defense defendants that exhibit high 
Consensus and high Distinctiveness would have more success (i.e. found not guilty), while for 
the brain damage defense defendants that exhibit low C nsensus and low Distinctiveness would 
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be more successful.  3) Aspects of Pennington and Hastie’s (1986) Story Model would be 
utilized by participants for making their choices. 
 To test these hypotheses, two experiments were performed.  In Experiment 1, participants 
were provided with a standard trial summary in which a defendant is accused of purchasing 
stolen property.  The summaries included all the rel vant information from a trial and differed 
based on the type of defense utilized and aspects of Attribution Theory.  Experiment 2 expanded 
on the previous study by utilizing a card selection ask in which participants were given an 
abridged trial summary and offered the choice of which evidence they wished to see.   
Experiment 1 
 The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine two separate types of excuse defenses: 
Entrapment and Brain Damage.  This experiment also explored how the three components of 
Kelley’s (1971) model of Attribution interact with ese two types of defenses.  To accomplish 
this, participants read a vignette about a hypothetical trial and played the part of a mock juror. 
Given the previous discussion, it was expected that the aspects of Kelley’s model that would 
contribute to the success of the excuse would differ systematically depending on the type of 
defense used.  It was predicted that for Entrapment, high Consensus and high Distinctiveness 
would lead to a greater number of acquittals, a pattern that according to Kelley would result in a 
circumstance attribution.  Meanwhile, for the Brain Damage defense, low Consensus and low 
Distinctiveness would lead the defense to be more successful.  This pattern according to Kelley 
would result in a person attribution, however, as mentioned before, the participants may view 
these internal attributes as separate from the individual’s “true self”.   
 Also included in Experiment 1 was a scale designed to assess participants’ Crime Control 
versus Due Process Orientations (CCDPO, Liu & Shure, 1993).  Participants’ CCDPO has been 
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shown to have a highly significant effect on verdicts in cases involving the Entrapment defense 
(Peters, Lampinen, & Malesky, 2012).  A similar importance is expected for the Entrapment 
defense in the current study.  It is possible that a similar effect may be found for participants who 
view a trial involving a Brain Damage excuse defense; however, to date there has been no 
research specific to the effects of CCDPO on these sorts of cases.  Therefore, the importance of 
participants’ CCDPOs in the Brain Damage trial were unclear. 
Method 
 Participants.  This experiment consisted of 473 community participants recruited over 
the Internet via the online site Mechanical Turk.  All participants were paid 15 cents for their 
participation in the study.  In order to be included in the analysis, the participants were required 
to have answered three very simple comprehension questions correctly.  Fifty participants 
(10.6%) failed to do so and were excluded from the analysis.  Of the remaining 423 participants, 
a slight majority were female (63.6%) and the averag  ge was 34.16 (SD = 13.16) years old.  
The participants claimed mostly to be moderate (32.2%) or moderately liberal (24.6%) in their 
political beliefs.  Only a small proportion claimed to be liberal (24.6%), moderately conservative 
(13.0%), or conservative (10.9%).  A small number had actually served on a jury in the past 
(14.4%) and the vast majority had no formal legal tr ining (90.3%). 
 Design.  A 3 (Defense Type: Entrapment, Brain Damage, Control) X 2 (Consensus: 
High, Low) X 2 (Distinctiveness: High, Low) between-subjects design was used.  The Defense 
Type variable was designed to directly examine differences in verdicts based on the type of 
excuse defense utilized.  In the Entrapment condition, the defendant attempted to utilize an 
entrapment defense, claiming that his actions were caused by the undercover officer.  In the 
Brain Damage condition, the defendant made the claim that due to a previously incurred brain 
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injury, he was prone to impulse control problems.  Finally, the control condition was identical to 
the Brain Damage condition except the defendant had no brain damage and utilized no excuses. 
 The other two variables were designed to examine the Consensus and Distinctiveness 
aspects Kelley’s (1971) Attribution model.  Each variable consisted of both a high and a low 
condition.  It was decided not to include a third “No information provided” control condition for 
each of the three aspects, because it is likely that w en participants were not explicitly provided 
the information, they would infer the information otheir own.  In essence, instead of being a 
control condition, it would have acted as a free varying condition which could potentially 
confound the results.  It was also decided not to include Consistency for the reason that an 
excuse defense would be extremely unlikely in the case that the defendant committed the same 
crime under the same circumstances.  The Consistency condition also ran the risk of the added 
issue of “repeat offenders” which may cause a negative opinion of the defendant separate from 
the trial at hand. 
 Materials and procedure.  All participants were provided with a link to ano line survey 
site where they were presented with a consent form.  Following the acceptance of the consent 
form, the participants were directed to the webpage wh re demographic information was 
collected.  After completing the demographic questionnaire, participants were presented with a 
trial summary (see Appendix 1 for example) involving a defendant accused of purchasing stolen 
property (a stolen bicycle).  The defendant attemptd to utilize one of two types excuse defenses: 
Entrapment or Brain Damage.  In the Entrapment defens  trial, the defendant purchased the 
bicycle from an undercover police officer during a sting operation, while in the Brain Damage 
defense trial he purchased it from a thief who was already under surveillance.  In both cases, the 
defense purported that the defendant lacked the ability to form intent, a requirement to be found 
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guilty.  In the Entrapment defense condition, the defense lawyer asserted that his client’s ability 
to form intent was impaired by the actions of the police officer.  Meanwhile, in the Brain 
Damage condition, the defense lawyer claimed that the defendant’s ability to form intent was 
impaired by brain damage he had previously incurred earlier in his life.  
 The summary had all the components of a typical tri l, including both sides’ opening and 
closing statements, the calling of witnesses, the presentation of evidence, and the providing of 
judicial instructions.  The witnesses consisted of the seller of the bicycle for the prosecution, and 
the defendant himself for the defense.  The main evidence presented consisted of the recorded 
conversation between the defendant and the seller of the bicycle. 
 Also included in the summary were variations of the Consensus and Distinctiveness 
aspects of Kelley’s (1971) Attribution Theory.  Both of the aspects were interspersed in the 
presentation of evidence.  For Consensus, a statemen  was made concerning the prevalence of 
individuals arrested in the same situation for the same crime, either a significant number had 
been arrested (high consensus) or only a small number had been arrested (low consensus).  For 
Distinctiveness, the statements differed depending on the type of defense utilized.  In the trials 
where the Entrapment defense was used, a statement indicated whether the defendant had a 
previous pattern of criminal activity (low distinctiveness) versus being a model citizen (high 
distinctiveness).  The same statement was used for the Control condition in which the defendant 
did not try to use a defense.  Meanwhile, for the Brain Damage condition, the participant read 
statements made by a doctor regarding previous behavior patterns of the defendant.  The 
defendant either had consistent difficulties with impulse control (low distinctiveness) or showed 
no previous difficulties (high distinctiveness). 
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 Following the reading of the trial summary, participants were first asked a few very easy 
multiple choice comprehension questions as a manipulat on check to make sure they actually 
read the summary (What was the defendant charged with?; What was the primary piece of 
evidence presented?; What was the object of central importance for the trial?). Afterwards, they 
were prompted to make a decision on how likely they would be to find the defendant guilty 
(Guilt Ratings) on a scale of -3 (very unlikely) to +3 (very likely).  They were also asked to make 
an absolute judgment of guilty or not guilty and to pr vide an indication of their confidence in 
this verdict.  At this time, as a manipulation check, participants were asked to answer the 
following four questions regarding their views of the case participants: How responsible was the 
defendant for his actions?, to what extent were the def ndant’s actions persuaded by law 
enforcement officials (reverse scored)?, to what extent was the defendant motivated to solicit a 
minor prior to this event?, and to what extent would the law enforcement official’s actions 
persuade an average person to commit the offence (rev rse scored)? Each of these questions was 
responded to on a 7-point likert scale (1=not at all – 7=completely).  These questions were 
combined to provide an Attribution Score with higher scores indicating more attribution of 
responsibility to the defendant.  Finally, participants completed two questionnaires designed to 
tap their Crime Control/ Due Process Orientation (CCDPO, Liu & Shure, 1993).  The first was 
the Procedural Due Process Scale (PDPS), which examined the importance participants placed 
on members of the legal system following the proper procedures in obtaining evidence or 
running a trial.  The second scale was the Due Process versus Crime Control Scale (DPCCS), 
which measured the more ideological viewpoints of the participant regarding the goals of justice 




 Manipulation check.  A manipulation check was first run to test the effectiveness of the 
Attribution manipulation on altering participants Attribution of Responsibility to the defendant.  
Given that it was hypothesized that Attribution would act differently depending on the type of 
defense utilized, the two defenses were analyzed separately.  A 2 (Distinctiveness) X 2 
(Consensus) Between Subjects Factorial Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was run with 
Attribution of Responsibility as the dependent variable.  Neither the Attribution of Responsibility 
for the Entrapment Defense interaction (F(2, 157) = 3.34, p = .069, partial η2 = .021), nor the 
Brain Damage Defense interaction (F(2, 157) = 0.94, p = .334, partial η2 = .006) were 
significantly affected by the Consensus or Distinctiveness variables.  Therefore, it was 
determined that the manipulation check failed, the two Attribution variables did not change 
participants’ Attribution of Responsibility to the defendant. 
 Absolute verdicts.  An initial Binary Logistic Regression was run with the demographic 
variables as predictors and Verdict as the dependent variable.  None of the demographic 
variables were significant, so further analyses collapsed over these variables. 
 To analyze the raw verdicts, a hierarchical binary logistic regression was utilized (see 
Table 1 for logistic regression results).  Included in the first step of the regression were the three 
primary variables of Defense Type (dummy coded), Consensus, and Distinctiveness.  The second 
step included the two-way interactions for the three primary variables and the third step included 
the three-way interactions.  Step one of the regression was significant, Χ2step
 (4) = 23.72, 
Nagelkerke R2step
 = 0.07, p < .001.  There was a significant effect of the Defense Type variable 
for both dummy codes (Brain Damage p = .030, Entrapment p < .001).  Participants were more 
likely to find the defendant guilty in the Control condition (65.7%) than the Brain Damage 
condition (53.1%) and the Entrapment condition (37.9%).  The two Attribution variables had no 
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significant effects.  Step two of the regression was not significant, Χ2step
 (5) = 7.97, Nagelkerke 
R2step
 = 0.02, p = .158.  There was, however, a significant interaction between the Consensus 
variable and the Defense Type dummy code for Brain D mage (p =  .05).  Only participants 
given the Brain Damage Defense, but not the other two defenses, were affected by Consensus.  
The High Consensus group (45.7%) was more likely to find the defendant guilty than 
participants in the Low Consensus group (60.3%).  There was also a marginally significant 
interaction between the Distinctiveness variable and the Defense Type dummy code for Brain 
Damage (p = .081).  Similar to Consensus, only participants presented with the Brain Damage 
Defense, but not the other defenses, were affected by Distinctiveness.  Participants in the High 
Distinctiveness group (51.4%) were more likely to find the defendant guilty than participants in 
the Low Distinctiveness group (54.8%). There were no other significant two way interactions. 
Step three of the regression was also not significat, Χ2step
 (2) = 0.86, Nagelkerke R2step
 = 0.01, p 
= .65.  There were no significant three way interactions. 
 Guilt ratings.  A 3 (Defense Type) X 2 (Consensus) X 2 (Distinctiveness) Between-
Subjects Factorial ANOVA was run on the dependent variable Guilt Ratings.  Higher Guilt 
Ratings indicated the participants’ likelihood of choosing a guilty verdict.  The Defense Type 
variable had a significant main effect on participants’ Guilt Ratings, F(2, 411) = 19.19, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .085.  Post-hoc Tukeys indicated that both the Brain Damage (M = 0.20, SE = 0.15, p 
= .005) condition and the Entrapment (M = -0.46, SE = 0.15, p < .001) condition resulted in 
significantly lower Guilt Ratings than the Control (M = 0.89, SE = 0.15) condition.  The Brain 
Damage condition also resulted in significantly higher Guilt Ratings than the Entrapment 
condition (p = .006).  Both the Consensus (F(1, 411) = 0.07, p = .788, partial η2 = .001) and 
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Distinctiveness (F(1, 411) = 1.36, p = .245, partial η2 = .003) variables were non-significant on 
their own.  There were no significant interactions. 
 Confidence.  Also assessed was participants’ confidence in theirrespective verdicts.  
Given that the guilty and not guilty verdicts are opp sites the independent variables could 
potentially have different consequences.  As a result, each verdict was analyzed separately using 
a 3 (Defense Type) X 2 (Consensus) X 2 (Distinctiveness) Between-Subjects Factorial Analysis 
of Variance with Confidence as the dependent variable.  For participants that selected Not 
Guilty, there was a main effect for Defense Type, F(2, 190) = 6.19, p = .002, partial η2 = .061.  
Post-hoc tests revealed that the Entrapment (M = 7.96, SE = 0.21) defense resulted in higher 
confidence in Not Guilty verdicts than both the Brain Damage (M = 7.11, SE = 0.24, p = .007) 
condition and the Control condition (M = 6.87, SE = 0.28, p = .002).  Neither the Consensus 
(F(1, 190) =  0.01, p = .93, partial η2 < .001) nor Distinctiveness (F 1, 190) =  2.32, p = .129, 
partial η2 = .012) variables had a significant main effect. 
 There were also two significant two-way interactions for participants that voted Not 
Guilty.  The first interaction was between Defense Type and Consensus, F(2, 190) = 3.60, p = 
.029, partial η2 = .037.  Post-hoc tests of the interaction revealed that for the Brain Damage 
condition, when participants were presented with a trial involving high Consensus information 
(M = 7.57, SE = 0.36) participants were significantly less confident in their Not Guilty verdict 
than when they were presented with a low Consensus trial (M = 6.65, SE = 0.31, p = .049).  Also 
a marginally significant interaction was found with participants in the Entrapment condition, 
such that participants who read the trial involving hi h Consensus information (M = 7.59, SE = 
0.28) were less confident in their Not Guilty verdicts than participants who read the low 
Consensus version (M = 8.34, SE = 0.30, p = .061).  The second interaction was between 
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Defense Type and Distinctiveness, F(2, 190) = 5.42, p = .005, partial η2 = .054.  Post-hoc tests 
of the interaction revealed that for the Control condition, when participants were presented with 
a trial in which the defendant’s actions were less di tinctive (M = 5.94, SE = 0.45) the 
participants were less confident in their Not Guilty verdict than participants in the trial in which 
the defendant’s actions were highly distinctive (M = 7.89, SE = 0.35, p = .002).  No other 
interactions were significant. 
 For participants that selected Guilty, there was a significant main effect for Defense Type 
(F(2, 209) = 5.17, p = .006, partial η2 = .047).  Participants in the Brain Damage condition (M = 
7.69, SE = 0.18) had significantly lower confidence in Guilty verdicts than participants in the 
Control condition (M = 8.49, SE = 0.17, p = .002).  The main effects of Consensus (F(1, 209) = 
0.15, p = .703, partial η2 = .001) and Distinctiveness (F(1, 209) = 0.04, p = .834, partial η2 < 
.001) were not significant. 
 For Guilty verdicts, there was also a significant three-way interaction between Defense 
Type, Consensus, and Distinctiveness, F(2, 209) = 5.43, p = .005, partial η2 = .049).  Post-Hoc 
comparisons revealed that when Consensus was high and Distinctiveness was low, participants 
in the Brain Damage condition (M = 7.15, SE = 0.35) were significantly less confident in their 
Guilty verdicts than participants in the Entrapment (M = 8.54, SE = 0.44, p = .038) and Control 
conditions (M = 9.17, SE = 0.32, p < .001).  No other interactions or comparisons were 
significant. 
 Crime Control Due Process Orientation.  In order to examine the effects of 
participants’ Crime Control/Due Process Orientation (CCDPO) on their verdicts, a hierarchical 
multiple logistic regression was run with the primary three independent variables in the first step, 
the two Crime Control/Due Process Orientation scales entered in the second step, and the 
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interactions between the CCDPO scales and the trial types entered on the third step.  The results 
of Step One were identical to the first step mentioned above in the Verdicts analysis section.  The 
second step of the regression was also significant (Χ2step
 (2) = 11.08, Nagelkerke R2step
 = .03, p = 
.004).  Further analyses revealed that both the PDPS and the DPCCS questionnaires were 
significant (see Table 2 for the logistic regression table).  It should be noted, that even in the 
second step, the Defense Type variables were still high y significant, indicating an effect all to 
themselves separate from the participants CCDPO.   Finally, the third step of the regression was 
not significant (Χ2step
 (4) = 7.45, Nagelkerke R2step
 = .02, p = .134), however, the interaction 
between one of the CCDPO scales, the Procedural Due Process Scale, and the Entrapment 
Defense was significant.  Individuals who placed a higher importance on following the rules of 
due process were more likely to find a defendant Not Guilty when the Entrapment Defense was 
utilized.  This interaction was further examined by comparing the correlations between CCDPO 
and verdicts for the two verdict types separately.  A Spearmans’ correlation revealed that for the 
Entrapment defense, there was a weak significant negative correlation between the CCDPO 
scales and verdicts for the DPCCS scale (r(161) = -0.17, p = .029), however, not for the PDPS 
scale (r(161) = -0.14, p = .075).  For the Brain Damage defense, neither the DPCCS scale (r(156) 
= -0.08, p = .326), nor the PDPS scale (r(156) = -0.01, p = .901) were significantly correlated 
with verdicts.  The correlations for each scale were then compared using a z-test.  The 
correlations were not significantly different from each other for neither the PDPS scale, z(317) = 
1.15, p = .250, nor the DPCCS scale z(317) = 0.81, p = .418. 
Discussion 
 The goal of Experiment 1 was to examine how aspect of Attribution Theory may 
differentially affect two different types of excuse d fenses: Entrapment and Brain Damage.  In 
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general, participants seemed to at least prefer when defendants attempted some sort of excuse 
defense rather than the Control condition which is somewhat promising.  With regard to the 
Attribution variables, it was hypothesized that information indicating high consensus and high 
distinctiveness would be more successful for defendants utilizing the Entrapment Defense.  
Meanwhile, for the Brain Damage Defense, it was hypothesized that low consensus and low 
distinctiveness would result in a greater acquittal rate.  There was a significant problem with the 
sample obtained from Mechanical Turk, however.  Overall, there were a very high number of 
participants eliminated for failing three very simple comprehension questions.  This indicates 
that a number of the participants did not read the summary at all (and were removed from the 
analysis).  Of those that actually got the question correct, there is a high likelihood that a 
significant number also did not read the summary veclosely as can be seen by the failed 
manipulation check.  Given all of this, any conclusion  from the above analyses are highly 
suspect.   
 That being said, the hypothesis was partially confirmed when looking solely at 
participant verdicts.  For the Brain Damage Defense, both low Consensus and low 
Distinctiveness resulted in more Not Guilty verdicts, however, no effect was found for the 
Entrapment Defense.  This pattern also did not persist with regard to Guilt Ratings where there 
was only a significant main effect of Trial Type in which the Control Defense resulted in 
significantly higher Guilt Ratings.  With regard to Confidence in Verdicts we again get a partial 
confirmation of the hypothesis.  For Not Guilty verdicts, High Consensus significantly lowered 
participants’ confidence in their verdicts for the Brain Damage Defense; however, High 
Consensus also lowered participants’ confidence in verdicts for the Entrapment Defense.  It is 
unclear why participants acted in this way.  It could be speculated that perhaps participants were 
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using a self-serving bias in that when more people were arrested for the crime, they attempted to 
distance themselves from the criminals and it made them question their Not Guilty verdicts. 
Also, somewhat contrary to the hypothesis, Distinctiveness only had an effect on the Control 
condition, and this could have simply been an example of the participants being more lenient on 
the defendant with less of a criminal record.  For Guilty Verdicts, again there was partial 
evidence for the hypothesis, with low Distinctiveness resulting in less confidence in a guilty 
verdict, however, only when Consensus was high, which is counter-intuitive. 
 Finally, one of the strongest predictors in the results above was participants’ Crime 
Control versus Due Process Orientation.  It washed out all other variables except the Defense 
Type variable.  This makes sense, in that if the participant barely read the summary, they are 
likely to be driven by their previous beliefs toward Excuse Defenses in general which would 
likely be highly susceptible to their Crime Control versus Due Process Orientation.  This is 
especially true with Entrapment, where an interaction exists with participant views on the 
importance of procedural due process.  Individuals who stress the importance of following 
proper legal procedures are likely to be more accepting of a defense that focuses on the actions 
of law enforcement.  Despite the problems with the sample, Experiment 1 still has some potential 
applied implications that will be discussed more in depth later.  
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 1 was focused on how potential jurors might utilize evidence related to 
Attribution Theory differently depending on the type of excuse defense used.  However, 
Experiment 1 was not able to tell us anything about the relative importance of different types of 
evidence to potential jurors.  Nor was it able to tell us anything about the potential cognitive 
processes going on in the jurors’ minds.  Is there any particular type of evidence that is 
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particularly necessary in a juror’s eyes? At what point does the juror have enough evidence to 
make a decision?  Experiment 2 attempted to answer these sorts of questions utilizing a card 
selection task similar to one utilized by Payne (1976) to examine consumer decision heuristics. 
 In his study, Payne (1976) wanted to determine the pathways individuals go through 
when making a decision.  To accomplish this, the experimenter presented participants with 
“information boards” concerning single bedroom apartments that the individual had to choose 
between.  On the board were a set of labeled envelopes from which the participant pulled a card 
that provided information on different things the individual would be interested in, for example 
price or noise level.  The participant could choose the information in any order and could choose 
to make a decision at any time.  This revealed the relative importance of each piece of 
information.  Experiment 2 used a similar paradigm, but modified for a jury decision making 
task like the one in Experiment 1.  It was expected that participants would choose what they 
believe to be the most important evidence to making a decision first.  Given that the participants 
were attempting to determine whether the defendant w s responsible for his actions, it was 
predicted that participants would lend higher weight to evidence related to Attribution Theory.  It 
was also predicted that given the differences in the two defenses a different pattern of importance 
would arise for the evidence depending on the type of defense.  
Method 
 Participants. This experiment consisted of 104 university student participants recruited 
from the subject pool at the University of Arkansas.  Participants received partial course credit 
for completing the experiment.  Three participants were dropped from the analysis due to failing 
to understand the procedure.  Of the remaining 101 participants, 64 (63.4%) were female and the 
average age was 19.76 (SD = 3.88) years old.  The vast majority (81.2%) identified as Caucasian, 
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with only 3% identifying as African American, 5% identifying as Hispanic, 6% as Asian, and 4% 
as Other (one participant chose not to respond).  Only three participants claimed to have actually 
served on a jury before. 
 Design.  A 2 (Defense Type: Entrapment, Brain Damage) X 2 (Likely Verdict: Guilty, 
Not Guilty) X 6 (Information Type: Pure Facts, Coherence, Attribution Theory: Consensus, 
Attribution Theory: Distinctiveness, Opening Statements, Foils) mixed-factorial design was 
used.  The Defense Type variable was identical to the one utilized in Experiment 1, except the 
control condition was left out to decrease the number of necessary participants.  The Likely 
Verdict variable refers to the verdict all the evidence available was likely to push the participant 
to make.  In other words, the evidence was stacked (based on previous Story Model and 
Attribution Theory research) in favor of one side, either the prosecution or defense.  For 
example, in the trial that favors the prosecution, the prosecution’s evidence was more coherent 
and plausible, while the defense’s was not.  This variable was necessary to examine the relative 
importance of each of the types of trial evidence with regard to making a guilty verdict or a not 
guilty verdict.  It was possible that the two verdicts may have different information that was 
important to the mock jurors.  Both the Defense Type and Likely Verdict variables were 
between-subjects variables.   
 The Information Type variable was a within-subjects variable and consisted of different 
types of evidence that could have been chosen by the participant.  Pure Facts cards consisted of 
items that were completely factual and relevant to the trial, however do not appear to have a 
direct theoretical underpinning, for example, the fingerprints of the defendant being found on the 
bicycle.  Coherence cards consisted of items that were directly or indirectly related to the 
Coherence facet of Pennington and Hastie’s (1986) Story Model.  For example, the defendant 
75 
 
claimed that he did not need a bicycle, despite the fact that he is a bicycle delivery boy and his 
bicycle was in disrepair.  The Attribution cards were directly related to aspects of Kelley’s 
(1971) model.  These were separated into the same two categories as in Experiment 1: Consensus 
and Distinctiveness.  The Opening Statement cards were solely the opening statements made by 
either the Defense Attorney or the Prosecuting Attorney.  While not “evidence” per se, it was 
thought it would be interesting to see if potential jurors considered the opening statements and 
what sort of emphasis they put on them.  Finally, the Foil cards were information related to the 
trial, but that should be entirely irrelevant, for example, the name of the neighborhood where the 
alleged crime took place. 
 Materials and procedure.  Participants were taken to an experiment room one at a time 
by a research assistant where they were asked to sign a consent form and fill out a demographics 
questionnaire.  Once the participant completed the questionnaire, their attention was directed by 
the research assistant toward a large desk upon which a number of envelopes were placed.  On 
the outside of each of the envelopes was a question that involved different pieces of evidence or 
aspects of the trial.  Inside each card was the answer to the question written on the outside (See 
Appendix 2 for entire list of questions and answers).  The envelopes were organized in a random 
order prior to the participant’s entry and in such a way as to all be clearly visible.  The research 
assistant then handed an abridged trial summary to the participant.  The trial summary was a 
truncated version of the one utilized in Experiment 1 (See Appendix 2).  Instead of including all 
the parts of a trial, it only included the defendant’s ame, what he was accused of, and a very 
basic outline of the crime.   
 The research assistant then read the following instructions out loud to the participant 
while they followed along on paper: “In this experiment you will be examining evidence from an 
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actual criminal court trial.  The trial evidence has been reviewed by a panel of legal experts who 
have come to a consensus as to the correct verdict.  You have been handed an outline of a trial 
and in front of you is a variety of possible evidenc  that could be presented in that trial.  Your 
job is to play the part of a juror who must decide th  guilt or innocence of the defendant.  To 
accomplish this, you will choose which evidence youwish to examine one piece at a time from 
the envelopes in front of you.  You have as long as you want and may choose any piece of 
evidence in any order; however, you are encouraged to think about your choices thoroughly 
before choosing.  The goal is to come to the correct v rdict in as few flips as possible.” 
 The trial outline and evidence varied depending on the type of excuse defense the 
defendant was utilizing: Entrapment or Brain Damage.  The evidence within each of the 
envelopes also varied depending on whether the partici nt was in the Guilty or Not Guilty 
condition.  The evidence was all related to the above mentioned within-subjects categories.  Each 
envelope chosen was recorded by the research assistant, and a camera was set up to make sure no 
recording errors were made.   
The above protocol required participants to examine the cards until they felt that they 
could make a decision.  In order to prevent participants from making too hasty of a decision, a 
minimum number of eight cards was decided upon, however, this was not told to the participant 
beforehand.  If the participant tried to make a decision before the required number was met, he or 
she was prompted by the research assistant saying “Now if you had to choose X more cards what 
would they be in order of importance,” where X was the number required for them to reach the 




 None of the demographic variables were significant, so further analyses were collapsed 
over them.  To examine how participants chose which evidence to view, two different analyses 
were performed.  One analysis examined how often each type of evidence was chosen to be 
viewed by the participants, while the other analysis examined the order relative order each type 
of evidence was chosen. 
 Evidence chosen. The first analysis identified whether each piece of vidence was 
viewed (1) or not (0).  Then the number of evidence for each category was added together and 
divided by the total possible for that type of evidence.  A Mixed Factorial Analysis of Variance 
was then run with the Type of Evidence as the Within Subjects Variable, Defense Type and 
Likely Verdict as the Between Subjects Independent Variables, and the average number of 
evidence chosen as the Dependent Variable.  There was a main effect for Type of Evidence, F(5, 
485) = 53.63, p < .001, partial η2 = .356 (see Table 3 for means).  Neither Defense Type (F(1, 
97) = 1.14, p =.289 , partial η2 = .012) nor Likely Verdict (F(1, 97) = 0.47, p = 497, partial η2 = 
.005) produced significant main effects.   
 More importantly, there was a significant interaction between Defense Type and the Type 
of Evidence F(5, 485) = 4.23, p = .001, partial η2 = .042.  To examine this interaction, a series of 
planned comparisons were performed.  First the Defens  Types were analyzed separately to 
explore differences between the Types of Evidence for both (see Table 4).  For both the Brain 
Damage and Entrapment Defense, all types of evidence were chosen significantly more often 
than Filler evidence (p < .001), indicating that participants were at least taking the task seriously.  
For both defenses, participants also tended to wantto view the opening statements.  There were 
differences in the patterns between the two defenses however.  For the Entrapment Defense, 
Consensus, Distinctiveness, and Coherence evidence were all selected significantly more often 
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than purely factual evidence (p < .001).  Meanwhile, for the Brain Damage Defense condition, 
only Distinctiveness was selected significantly more ften than purely Factual evidence (p = 
.038).  Distinctiveness was also selected significantly more often than Consensus evidence (p <
.01). 
 The interaction was further examined by comparing the importance of each type of 
evidence between the two types of defenses using a series of independent samples t-tests (see 
Figure 1).  The only important difference between the two defenses was seen in Consensus 
evidence being selected significantly more often in the Entrapment Defense condition than in the 
Brain Damage Defense condition, t(99) = 5.82, p < .001, cohen’s d = 1.16.  Filler evidence was 
also selected more often in the Entrapment Defense condition, t(99) = 2.08, p < .040, cohen’s d = 
0.42, however, this is thought to just be an artifac  of the tiny amount chosen in both conditions.  
Factual Evidence (t(99) = 1.29, p = .202, cohen’s d = 0.26), Distinctiveness Evidence (t(99) = 
0.43, p = .669, cohen’s d = 0.09), Coherence Evidence (t(99) = 0.96, p = .340, cohen’s d = 0.19), 
and Opening Statements ((99) = 0.53, p = .596, cohen’s d = 0.11) were not significantly 
different between the two defense conditions. 
 Evidence rankings. The second analysis examined the rank importance of the different 
types of evidence.  If a piece of evidence was chosen first, it was assigned the number of the total 
possible cards (N).  The second piece chosen was then assigned a number 1 less (N-1), and so 
on.  For example, if there were 20 potential pieces of evidence possible, the first piece chosen 
was assigned a 20, the second a 19, and so on.  Evidence not chosen was assigned a zero.  A 
second Mixed Factorial Analysis of Variance was run with the type of evidence as the Within 
Subjects Independent Variable, Defense Type and Likely Verdict as the Between Subjects 
Independent Variables, and the evidence rank as the Dep ndent Variable.  There was a main 
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effect for Type of Evidence, F(5, 485) = 52.89, p < .001, partial η2 = .353 (See Table 5 for 
means), and Defense Type, F(1, 97) = 5.87, p = .017, partial η2 = .057.  Likely Verdict still did 
not produce a significant effect F(1, 97) = 0.43, p = .017, partial η2 = .057. 
 Similar to the Evidence Chosen analysis, there was a significant interaction between 
Defense Type and the Type of Evidence F(5, 485) = 3.79, p = .002, partial η2 = .038.  To 
examine this interaction, the same series of planned comparisons were performed as in the first 
analysis.  First the Defense Types were analyzed separately to explore differences between the 
Types of Evidence for both defenses (see Table 6).  Results were almost identical to the 
Evidence Chosen analyses above.  Again for both the Brain Damage and Entrapment Defense, 
all types of evidence were chosen significantly more ften than Filler evidence (p < .001), 
indicating that participants chose the evidence in some sort of order on purpose rather than 
choosing by random.  Also, participants placed a high emphasis for both defense types on the 
opening statements desiring to see them fairly early on in the process.  The two defenses, 
however, differed in the pattern of relative importance participants placed on types of evidence.  
For the participants that viewed the Entrapment Defense trial, Consensus, Distinctiveness, and 
Coherence evidence were all ranked significantly more important than purely Factual evidence 
(ps < .05), however, none of the three were ranked significantly more important than each other.  
For the Brain Damage defense on the other hand, Distinctiveness once again took priority, being 
selected significantly higher than all other types of evidence except Coherence (ps < .05). 
 The interaction was further examined by comparing the average rankings of each type of 
evidence between the two types of defenses using a series of independent samples t-tests (See 
Figure 2).  There were three significant differences b tween the two Defense Types.  Similar to 
the Evidence Chosen analysis, Consensus (t(99) = 6.96, p < .001, cohen’s d = 1.362) and Filler 
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(t(99) = 2.42, p = .017, cohen’s d = 0.480) evidence were ranked significantly higher for the 
Entrapment Defense than the Brain Damage Defense.  Again the significant difference for Filler 
evidence is thought to be an artifact of the averag r nkings being so small.  Finally, Coherence 
evidence was ranked significantly higher for the Entrapment defense than the Brain Damage 
Defense, t(99) = 2.09, p = .039, cohen’s d = 0.417.  Factual Evidence (t(99) = 1.17, p = .245, 
cohen’s d = 0.232), Distinctiveness Evidence (t(99) = 0.69, p = .491, cohen’s d = 0.138), and 
Opening Statements (t(99) = 0.27, p = .791, cohen’s d = 0.053) were not significantly different 
between the two defense conditions. 
Discussion 
 The purpose of Experiment 2 was to examine the preferences participants would have for 
different types of evidence in a trial.  To accomplish this, a design was used in which participants 
were given a skeleton of a trial and allowed to choose the evidence they wished to see in order to 
come to a verdict as fast as they could.  Based on the assumption that participants would choose 
the evidence they believed most important first, it was hypothesized that evidence related to 
Attribution Theory would be selected more often andearlier than other pieces of evidence.  
Significant evidence was found in favor of this hypothesis: Attribution Theory played a 
significant part in participants’ choices for evidenc .  More importantly, the pattern exhibited for 
each type of defense differed significantly. 
 Both the average number of times each type of evidence was selected as well as the 
average ranking for each type of evidence were examined.  The patterns were highly similar.  For 
the Entrapment Defense, Consensus, Distinctiveness, and Coherence evidence were all ranked 
significantly more important than purely Factual evid nce.  Meanwhile, for the Brain Damage 
Defense, Distinctiveness was key outstripping all other types of evidence except Coherence.  
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This makes sense in that while all three types of evidence are important when attempting to 
determine whether Entrapment occurred, really only evidence that seems to provide proof of the 
truth of the defendant’s disability should be important in a Brain Damage Defense.  This includes 
evidence surrounding the sequence of events at the crim (Coherence), as well as evidence for 
how the defendant acts in other circumstances (Distinctiveness).  Meanwhile, Consensus only 
seemed to matter for participants when they were presented with the Entrapment Defense.  This 
also makes sense, because for Entrapment, whether others fall for the same sting operation could 
be an indicator that the police were out of line and tricked innocent individuals.  However, for 
Brain Damage what does it matter to a juror if others are committing the same criminal act?  All 
that matters is what this specific individual did, since he is claiming something specifically 
wrong with himself caused him to act that way.  Overall, Experiment 2 was consistent with the 
hypothesis and more importantly provided a great del of clarification for the initial theory which 
will be discussed below.  
General Discussion 
 The goal of the current research was to examine pot ntial theoretical models for how 
jurors would make decisions in a trial where an excuse defense was utilized.  In an excuse 
defense, the juror has to go beyond simply determining whether a defendant committed an illegal 
act or not, and make a decision as to whether the defen ant should be held criminally responsible 
for the illegal act.  Current theories of Jury Decision Making cannot account for this extra step in 
the process.  Therefore, a theory that integrated Attribution Theory (Kelley, 1971) into the 
existing Story Model for jury decision making (Pennington & Hastie, 1986) was proposed.  The 
veracity of this theory was tested in two separate experiments.   
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 Experiment 1 was designed to examine the effects of different aspects of Kelley’s (1971) 
Attribution model within the context of a typical Trial Summary paradigm.  Participants were 
presented with a vignette in which a defendant was accused of a crime and attempted to utilize 
either an Entrapment or Brain Damage excuse defense.  It was hypothesized that evidence that 
indicated high consensus and high distinctiveness would be more successful for defendants 
utilizing the Entrapment Defense.  Meanwhile, for the Brain Damage Defense, it was 
hypothesized that low consensus and low distinctiveness evidence would result in fewer guilty 
verdicts.  Experiment 1 was plagued with participant issues, with a high removal rate for failing 
simple comprehension questions, and the high likelihood that a number of those who did pass the 
comprehension questions did not read the Trial Summary close enough to notice the 
manipulation.  As a result, only limited evidence was found for the hypothesis.  Future research 
should be done in a more controlled setting in an attempt to dissuade participants from skimming 
the Trial Summary. 
 That being said, Experiment 1 did yield some important findings.  First, it was clear that 
participants preferred when defendants at least attempted some sort of Excuse Defense, as 
opposed to the Control condition where the defendant merely attempted to say he should not be 
held responsible.  There are two possible explanatio s for this.  First, perhaps participants were 
more convinced to decrease responsibility attributed to the defendant when an “official” Excuse 
Defense is presented by the defense counsel.  Essentially the presence of an “official” defense 
could lend more credibility to the attempts of the defendant to decrease responsibility for his 
actions and thereby make the defense overall more effective.  The other, more theoretically 
interesting, possibility is that when the defendant attempts to defer responsibility without 
providing an official Excuse Defense, the participants still viewed it as attempting to provide an 
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excuse, abet a very poor excuse.  As previously mentioned, when an individual attempted to 
provide an excuse that was not accepted, the transgressor was viewed more harshly than if they 
had simply apologized (Schlenker et al., 2001).  In the case of the current research, it is possible 
that the Control condition resulted in a harsher judgment by the participants who viewed it as a 
failed excuse.  Future research could examine this by having a second control condition where 
for example the defendant offered an apology instead of attempting to defer responsibility. 
 The second important finding of Experiment 1 was the overall importance of participants’ 
Crime Control/Due Process Orientation (CCDPO).  Theparticipants’ CCDPO overwhelmed all 
other variables except the general effect of what type of Excuse Defense was used.  If one 
considers that many of the participants only partially read the Trial Summary, their previous 
world beliefs would hold the most sway on their verdicts.  This makes sense when considered in 
the context of Snyder and Ickes’s (1985), strong versus weak situations.  In particular, 
participants’ views concerning their acceptance of Excuse Defenses would be highly important.  
Given that in Excuse Defenses the defendant is absolutely admitting to have committed the 
crime, an individual’s CCDPO is likely to have a major effect on their willingness to accept 
Excuse Defenses in general.  In a strong situation, individuals are heavily influenced by 
environmental factors pertaining to the situation.  However, in a weak situation, such as when an 
individual is not highly invested in a task, their personality tends to hold the most sway.   This 
has important implications for potential jurors if they have little invested in the trial’s outcome 
and do not pay careful attention to the trial.  While one may hope that all jurors would pay close 
attention at all times in a trial, in all likelihood this is not the case.  Jurors will at times lose f cus 
for various reasons, be it that they are overwhelmed by the sheer amount of discourse between 
the two sides, or that they simply do not care.  The above findings would suggest that in an 
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Excuse Defense trial this is of particular importance when one is attempting to overcome juror 
prejudices against the type of defense in general.  Future research should examine this 
possibility.  In conclusion, while Experiment 1 was plagued by participant issues it did result in 
some interesting theoretical and practical implications. 
 The purpose of Experiment 2 was to examine potential jurors’ preferences for different 
types of evidence in an Excuse Defense trial.  To acc mplish this, a novel paradigm was created 
in which participants were given a skeleton of a Trial Summary, and were allowed to select the 
evidence they wished to see in order to make a decision.  Recall, in a trial involving an Excuse 
Defense, the juror must make a verdict based on whether or not they believe the defendant 
should be held responsible for their crimes.  Given this, it was hypothesized that evidence related 
to Attribution Theory would be selected more often and earlier than other pieces of evidence.  
Strong evidence was found in favor of this hypothesis.  For Entrapment, both Consensus and 
Distinctiveness information was important; however, when the defendant was attempting a Brain 
Damage Defense, Distinctiveness evidence was deemed most important.  Not only was this 
consistent with the hypothesis, it provides some evidence to the initial overarching theory 
proposed in the introduction. 
Application to the Proposed Theory 
 Recall the initially proposed theory added another principle to Pennington and Hastie’s 
(1988) Story Model involving a step where the participant must make an Attribution of 
Responsibility.  The current research provides strong evidence for this.  Experiment 1 indicated 
that, when only partially paying attention, potential jurors will be strongly influenced by their 
previous views concerning Crime Control versus Due Process Orientation.  That jurors will 
utilize their previous world views is a critical component of the Story Model.  As a result, despite 
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the problems with the sample in Experiment 1, it did help to provide some evidence for basic 
Story Model mechanisms.  Furthermore, it perhaps could indicate some of the boundaries of 
manipulating potential jurors’ verdicts in an Excuse Defense trial.  In other words, are some 
previous beliefs about Excuse Defenses so pervasive that they overwhelm all the other evidence 
in the trial?  For example, in the previously mentio ed study on Online Sting Operations (Peters 
et al., 2012), the tendency was to find the defendant guilty regardless of the circumstances.  In 
this case, it is possible that the previous world views of the participants caused them to feel that 
there was no good excuse for soliciting a minor over th  Internet.  Are there other circumstances 
this would occur?  Is it possible to have the complete opposite with for example an Age Defense 
where the child is at an extremely young age?  These are important areas for future research. 
 Even clearer evidence was shown for the proposed theory by Experiment 2.  First of all, 
Experiment 2 found strong evidence for the importance still of information indicating the 
Coherence of the stories, which is a critical part of the Story Model (1988).  This makes sense in 
that how well the evidence fits together is still important in an Excuse Defense trial, and in fact 
may play a role in how the jurors make their attributions of responsibility.  Future research 
should examine this possibility.  In Experiment 2 participants also showed a clear preference for 
attribution based evidence as predicted by the proposed modified theory.  Furthermore, the 
findings helped to clarify specifically how Attribution Theory may work in Excuse Defense 
trials.  While overall participants focused on aspects of Attribution Theory, the aspects they 
cared about most depended on the type of Excuse Defens  used.  With trials involving 
Entrapment, both how the defendant acted toward the ot r situations and how other individuals 
acted toward the same situation as the defendant mattered.  In other words, if this was not 
normally how the defendant acted and others were also acting the same way to the sting 
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operation, then likely something about the sting operation was causing the defendant to act this 
way.  However, for trials involving the Brain Damage Defense, only how the defendant acted in 
other situations really mattered.  The potential jurors wanted to know if this was a constant 
behavioral pattern that clearly indicated some sort of mental deficit.  It is possible that this sort f 
information could play into the plausibility of the defendant’s claims of brain damage (another 
aspect of the Story Model) and future research should examine this possibility.  Overall, both 
Experiments 1 and 2 provide a great deal of evidence i  favor of the proposed theory as well as a 
wealth of possibilities for future research. 
Other Possible Theories 
 One recent popular theory in Jury Decision Making (Titcomb et al., 2012) has to do with 
the jurors tendencies towards Need for Cognition (NFC) and Need for Affect (NFA).  NFC refers 
to an individual’s motivations toward rational thought and desires to organize his or her 
experiences in a “meaningful” manner (Cohen, Stotland & Wolfe, 1955).  Individuals high in 
NFC tend to use the “central route of persuasion” and focus heavily on the relevant arguments 
being utilized.  Meanwhile, individuals low on NFC utilize the “peripheral route” and tend to 
focus more on surface information such as the physical attractiveness of the individual.  From a 
jury decision making perspective this could indicate how much weight the juror is willing to give 
to the evidence presented by each side versus more superficial aspects of the trial such as the 
appearance of the defendant.  NFA on the other handrefers to an individual’s motivations for 
seeking out or avoiding emotional experiences (Maio & Esses, 2001).  Individuals high in NFA 
tend to be more emotionally extreme and react more to emotionally salient events.  From a jury 
decision making perspective, an individual’s NFA could indicate how they will react to 
emotional arguments or evidence.  For example, an individual high in NFA would be greatly 
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influenced by more emotion laden evidence, such as detailed photographs of a murder scene or 
testimony from a victim of a violent crime. 
 While the current research did not directly examine NFC or NFA, given their popularity 
with regard to jury decision making research, it would seem prudent to address their possible 
application to the current research.  It is likely that both NFC and NFA could have a substantial 
impact on trials involving an Excuse Defense.  For example, individuals higher in NFA would 
likely have a greater difficulty accepting an excuse defense for a particularly salient trial such as 
an Online Sting Operation.  The current research specifically avoided such a scenario by 
choosing a relatively innocuous crime of purchasing a stolen bicycle.  It is also possible that both 
NFC and NFA could drive individuals’ tendencies to accept or refuse excuses.  For example, an 
excuse that focuses heavily on logic and rational thought may appeal to a jury member high in 
NFC.  Meanwhile, an excuse defense heavily laden in emotional arguments may be more 
effective for individuals high in NFA.  Future research should examine these possibilities. 
 An equally important way to further the currently discussed theory is to examine the 
findings from the lens of a different version of Attribution Theory.  One theory of particular 
application to the current discourse is Jones and McGillis’s (1976) attempt to integrate 
Correspondent Inference Theory with Kelley’s ANOVA model which they refer to as an 
“Integrated Attributional Analysis”.  In this integrated model, they specify two primary criteria 
that individuals will use to determine what sort of attribution to make regarding another 
individual’s actions: Category-based expectancies and Target-based expectancies.  Category-
based expectancies are similar to Kelley’s Consensus information, but expand the concept of 
Consensus to include both Stereotype information (expectations on how the individual should act 
based on his group affiliation) and Normative information (expectations concerning how 
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behaviors are created and maintained based on the sanctions imposed for deviating from the 
norm).  The current research does not directly attemp  to parse out these two separate areas, 
however, given the fact that in all the cases of a trial the individual is accused of violating norms 
this could be an important variable to examine.  Also the effects of stereotypes is a common 
theme in jury decision making, so examining these stereotypes within the context of Excuse 
Defenses and how they relate to Attribution Theory could be informative.  The second factor is 
Target-based expectancies which refer to inferences that are drawn from the knowledge an 
individual has about the target-person.  The second factor essentially combines Kelley’s 
Consistency and Distinctiveness variables, which is actually exactly what the current research 
did in the Distinctiveness variable used above.  Even though the Distinctiveness variable was 
looking at the defendant’s behavior toward other entiti s, it also included the temporal factor 
referred to in Consistency. This integrated factor is important when examining Excuse Defenses 
since Kelley’s Consistency and Distinctiveness can often be difficult to pull apart when referring 
to the defendant’s previous history.  These two factors map on to the current research well and 
offer great promise for future interpretations; however, Jones and McGillis’s theory does not stop 
there. 
 Jones and McGillis (1976) also stress the importance of determining intent when an 
individual is attempting to make either an internal or external attribution.  In previous 
incarnations of Correspondent Inference theory, the target’s behaviors were always assumed to 
be intentional and driven by a certain desired consequence.  However, it is possible that the 
target is unaware of potential consequences and their int ntion is called into question.  Jones and 
McGillis posit that Consistency information becomes particularly important in this case for 
determining intention.  This can be seen in Experimnt 2 as the combined 
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Consistency/Distinctiveness variable was selected often for both types of trials.  This idea of 
determining intent extremely useful when examining Excuse Defenses since by the legal 
definition, the juror’s duty is to determine whether the defendant had the capacity to form intent.  
Overall, while the current research did not explicitly examine Jones and McGillis’s integrated 
theory, it does hold significant promise in the future for examining Juror Decision Making in the 
context of Excuse Defenses. 
Limitations 
 There were several limitations of the current research.  With regard to Experiment 1, the 
largest limitation is the aforementioned problems with the sample obtained in Experiment 1.  
Overall, a number of participants were eliminated for clearly not reading the summary at all, and 
it is likely that a number more only skimmed the summary at best.  It is possible that the 
summary, even though it was only approximately three pages, was still too long in the context of 
an online population literally being paid pennies to participate.  The easiest solution to this 
problem is simply to run participants in the laborat y where there are a considerable number of 
social norm pressures to read the summary thoroughly.   
 The second limitation of Experiment 1 is that it was simply a trial summary format.  Trial 
summaries while easy to create and administer, are fr ught with problems concerning ecological 
validity.  The trial summaries even when taken seriously by the participant cannot truly 
encompass the different factors that go into a true trial.  In a trial summary, there is no actual 
defendant, and therefore, no one will suffer if the participant makes a “wrong decision”.  In other 
words, there is no possibility of sending an innocent man to jail, or of setting a guilty man free.  
As a result, trial summaries tend to lack much of the emotional components of a trial that may 
influence the juror’s verdicts.  Also, a trial summary is a greatly shortened version of the trial 
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and does not accurately portray all the different things that go into a trial.  It is highly unlikely 
that a real trial would ever be as short as the trial summary used, nor would any decent lawyer 
spend as little time in their opening and closing statements.  Finally, the trial summary only 
focuses on the decision making of a single jury memb r.  It does not take into account the fact 
that juries consist of multiple members that in turn have an effect on each other’s decision 
making processes.  Future research should remedy this by using more ecologically valid 
methods. 
 There were also limitations with regard to Experiment 2.  The methodology of 
Experiment 2 allowed participants to choose which evidence they wanted to see.  The first 
limitation with Experiment 2 involves the lack of ecological validity of the task.  In the real 
world, a juror does not get to select the evidence they want to hear, they are merely presented 
with what evidence is available and that the two side  want them to hear.  Secondly, the task is 
based on the assumption that the evidence participants thought they wanted to see actually was 
indicative of the types of evidence that matter most t  the juror when they actually have to make 
a decision.  In other words, what the juror thinks is important may not actually be what is 
important in the course of an actual trial.  For example, the importance of Consensus information 
is somewhat surprising considering the tendency of individuals to ignore consensus information 
as seen in the Fundamental Attribution Error, yet potential jurors seem to believe the information 
is important (Ross, 1977).  Perhaps in an actual trial, he Fundamental Attribution Error would 
take over and this consensus information would no lo ger be focused on. Despite these 
limitations, Experiment 2 did provide a better understanding into at least what the participants 





 Excuse Defenses require jurors to go beyond the typical trial and determine not whether a 
defendant committed an illegal act, but whether a defendant should be held responsible for their 
actions.  These types of defenses are becoming increasingly utilized in the United States, 
however, despite this; little has been done to examine this different type of trial.  In the current 
research, a new modified theory was proposed that added Attribution Theory to more traditional 
Jury Decision Making theories.  Overall, a significant amount of evidence was found for this 
modified theory; however, a great deal more research is necessary.  How jurors make decisions 
in a trial where a defendant utilizes an excuse defnse promises to be a fruitful and important 
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Experiment 1: Example Trial Summary 
 
What follows is a summary of trial proceedings in the case of Arkansas v. John Smith.  The 
defendant, a 28-year-old male living in Rogers, Arkansas, is charged with Theft by Receiving, a 
Class C felony. Theft by Receiving is defined as receiving or purchasing an item that the 
individual knows or believes is stolen. 
 
In his opening statement, the prosecutor claimed that the evidence would show that on March 23, 
2011, John Smith, knowingly and willingly purchased a bicycle that he believed was stolen. 
Smith, who delivers takeout via bicycle for a living, was approached by Robert Doled, a bicycle 
thief under surveillance by the police attempting to sell a stolen bicycle which was valued at 
approximately $500.  
 
Following a brief interaction between Smith and Doled, the defendant purchased the stolen 
bicycle and was promptly arrested. The prosecutor continued by explaining that the conversation 
in which the transaction occurred was recorded and that a portion of it would later be entered 
into evidence for the jury.  The prosecutor claimed that the recorded conversation is sufficient 
evidence to convict Smith.   
 
The defense attorney opened by admitting that Smith purchased the bicycle that he believed was 
stolen, but could not be held accountable for his actions due to receiving a traumatic brain injury 
at a young age that interferes with his ability to make decisions. The defense attorney claimed 
that the brain injury was such that Smith has extreme difficulty with impulse control.  He stated 
that had his client not sustained the injury, Smith never would have purchased the stolen bicycle. 
The defense attorney continued by stating that in order to be convicted of a crime, the individual 
must have both committed and INTENDED to commit an illegal act. The defense attorney 
concluded his opening statement by telling the jurythat due to the nature of his injury his client 
lacked the ability to form intent. 
 
The first witness for the prosecution was accused thief, Doled. Doled explained that on March 
23rd, he was attempting to sell a stolen bicycle when h approached Smith who had just made a 
delivery and was returning to his bicycle which was in poor condition. The prosecutor presented 
Doled with a copy of the recorded conversation which Doled acknowledged as accurate, then 
presented it to the jury: 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Doled: Hey there. You a delivery boy? 
Smith: Um, ya… do I know you? 
Doled: Your bike is looking pretty beat up there, bt you could use a new one. 
Smith: Er, I suppose so. 
Doled: How bout I make you a deal on this brand newbike I got here. 
Smith: What do you mean? 
Doled: This bike is worth $500, I’ll sell it to you for cheaper. 
Smith: Wow that does sound like a good deal, but what’s the catch? 
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Doled: No catch, just don’t ask me where I got it from. 
Smith: What do you mean? Is it stolen? 
Doled: Stolen is such a strong word, I prefer to say I permanently borrowed it without 
permission. 
Smith: I see. 
Doled: So you in or what? 




Doled continued to explain that this type crime hadoccurred frequently as of late in the local 
area.  Furthermore, almost every individual that had been approached by the thief had purchased 
the bicycle. 
 
The second witness was Smith himself. Smith acknowledged that the conversation did indeed 
take place and that he did attempt to purchase the bicycle; however, he claimed he was pressured 
to purchase it by the seller, Doled. Smith stated h had no intention of purchasing a stolen 
bicycle and had never had any desire to. 
 
Also entered into evidence was a written affidavit from Smith’s doctor indicating that Smith 
suffered from a traumatic brain injury to his Frontal Lobes. Furthermore, it was indicated that 
damage to this area has consistently been found in studies to interfere with impulse control. 
Previous behavioral records, however, indicate no significant impulse control problems. 
 
The prosecutor began his closing statement by reminding the jury that by his own words, Smith 
admitted to committing the crime of purchasing stolen property. He continued by pointing out 
that even though a doctor indicated that Smith’s injury was indeed true, it was up to the jury to 
determine whether this excused Smith from responsibility for his actions. 
 
The defense attorney began his closing statement by recalling the jury’s attention to the recorded 
conversation.  He reminded them that Doled, the thif, pressured Smith into purchasing the 
bicycle. This, when coupled with his brain injury tha  interfered with his ability to make good 
decisions clearly created a situation in which his client committed an act he previously would 
have no intention of doing. Therefore, he should be found not guilty. 
 
At this time, the judge told the jurors that all the relevant facts were in and it was their duty to 
deliberate until they reached a verdict. He then provided the jurors with instructions and released 






Experiment 2 Summaries and Envelopes 
Entrapment Summary 
What follows is a summary of trial proceedings in the case of Arkansas v. John Smith. The 
defendant, a 28-year-old male living in Rogers, Arkansas, is charged with Theft by Receiving, a 
Class C felony. Theft by Receiving is defined as receiving or purchasing an item that the 
individual knows or believes is stolen. 
 
On March 23, 2011, the defendant allegedly purchased  bicycle that he believed was stolen 
from one, Robert Doled, an under cover police officer. Smith has pled NOT GUILTY by reason 
of ENTRAPMENT. Entrapment is defined as an act of government agents or officials that 
induces a person to commit a crime he or she is not previously disposed to commit. According to 
United States law in order to be convicted of a crime, the individual must have both committed 
and intended to commit an illegal act. 
 
Entrapment Guilty Envelopes 
(1)[Who first approached the other individual?]- The defendant approached the undercover agent 
first and began the conversation. 
(4)[What price did the agent ask for the bicycle?]-The undercover agent offered to sell the 
bicycle to the defendant for $400. 
(7)[How many times did the agent offer to sell the bicycle before the defendant accepted?]- The 
undercover agent asked the defendant one time whether he wanted to buy the bicycle. 
(8)[What was the defendant’s previous criminal recod?]- The defendant has been convicted of a 
variety of other crimes, indicating a consistent pat ern of criminal activity. 
(9)[How many other individuals were arrested for the current sting operation?]- Despite frequent 
usage of the sting operation by the local police department, very few arrests have been made. 
(11)[How was the agent dressed at the time the sting operation took place?]- The undercover 
agent was dressed shadily, with a black leather jacket, jeans, and a chain around his waist. 
(12)[Where did the agent claim he obtained the bicycle?]- When the defendant asked the agent 
where the bicycle was obtained, the agent stated that it ad been obtained by “less than legal 
means.” 
 
Entrapment Not Guilty Envelopes 
(1)[Who first approached the other individual?]- The undercover agent approached the defendant 
first and began the conversation. 
(4)[What price did the agent ask for the bicycle?]-The undercover agent offered to sell the 
bicycle to the defendant for $50. 
(7)[How many times did the agent offer to sell the bicycle before the defendant accepted?]- The 
undercover agent asked the defendant three times whther he wanted to buy the bicycle. 
(8)[What was the defendant’s previous criminal recod?]- The defendant has never been 
convicted of any other crimes, indicating a lack of any pattern of criminal activity. 
(9)[How many other individuals were arrested for the current sting operation?]- This sting 
operation has been frequently used by the local police department and has resulted in the arrest 
of nearly every individual approached. 
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(11)[How was the agent dressed at the time the sting operation took place?]- The undercover 
agent was dressed normally, with a red sweater, jeans, and a brown belt. 
(12)[Where did the agent claim he obtained the bicycle?]- When the defendant asked the agent 
where the bicycle was obtained, the agent was vague nd avoided answering the question. 
 
Entrapment Neutral Envelopes 
(2)[How did the defendant appear at the trial?]: The defendant was well dressed in a suit with his 
hair combed neatly. He appeared bathed and had recently shaved. 
(3)[How was the defendant dressed at the time the sting operation took place?]: The defendant 
was dressed in a delivery suit that was clean and well kept. 
(5)[What was the prosecutor’s opening statement?]: The Prosecuting Attorney claimed the 
evidence would show that on March 23, 2011, John Smith, knowingly and willingly purchased a 
bicycle that he believed was stolen. He further claimed that the actions of the defendant had both 
the motivation and capacity to have purchased the bicycle and would have eventually sought to 
purchase a stolen bicycle even if he had never beenapproached by the undercover agent. 
(6)[What was the defending lawyer’s opening statement?]: The defense attorney opened by 
admitting that Smith purchased the bicycle that he believed was stolen, but could not be held 
accountable for his actions because he was wrongfully entrapped. The defense attorney claimed 
that Doled went beyond reasonable methods in an attemp  to trick Smith into a crime he was not 
predisposed to commit.  He stated that had the sting operation never occurred, Smith never 
would have purchased the stolen bicycle. 
(10)[How did the defendant act at the time of the arr st?]- When police arrested the defendant, 
he was compliant while still professing his innocen. 
 
 
Brain Damage Summary 
What follows is a summary of trial proceedings in the case of Arkansas v. John Smith. The 
defendant, a 28-year-old male living in Rogers, Arkansas, is charged with Theft by Receiving, a 
Class C felony. Theft by Receiving is defined as receiving or purchasing an item that the 
individual knows or believes is stolen. 
 
On March 23, 2011, the defendant allegedly purchased  bicycle that he believed was stolen 
from one, Robert Doled, a criminal under surveillance at the time. Smith has pled NOT GUILTY 
by reason of a BRAIN INJURY. Smith's brain injury is such that he has difficulty with impulse 
control. According to United States law in order to be convicted of a crime, the individual must 
have both committed and intended to commit an illegal act. 
 
Brain Damage Guilty Envelopes 
(1)[What was the extent of the defendant’s brain damage?]: According to a medical expert, the 
defendant's brain damage was minor, and the location was such that it could potentially impair 
impulse control. 
(2)[How did the defendant appear at the trial?]: The defendant was well dressed in a suit with his 
hair combed neatly. He appeared bathed and had recently shaved. 
(3)[How was the defendant dressed at the time the alleged crime took place?]: The defendant 
was dressed in a delivery suit that was clean and well kept. 
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(4)[What price did the seller ask for the bicycle?]-The bicycle thief offered to sell the bicycle to 
the defendant for $400. 
(7)[What was the defendant’s previous criminal recod?]- The defendant has never been 
convicted of any other crimes, indicating a lack of any pattern of criminal activity. 
(8)[How many other individuals were arrested for the current surveillance operation?]- This 
surveillance operation has been frequently used by the local police department and has resulted 
in the arrest of nearly every individual under surveillance. 
(9)[How did the defendant act at the time of the arr st?]- When police arrested the defendant, he 
was angry and resisted arrest. 
(10)[How was the seller dressed at the time the surveillance operation took place?]- The seller 
was dressed normally, with a red sweater, jeans, and a brown belt. 
(11)[Where did the seller claim he obtained the bicycle?]- When the defendant asked where the 
seller had obtained the bicycle, the seller replied that he had just “randomly found it in the 
street”, to which the defendant laughed. 
 
Brain Damage Not Guilty Envelopes 
(1)[What was the extent of the defendant’s brain damage?]: According to a medical expert, the 
defendant's brain damage was very significant, and the location was such that it could potentially 
impair impulse control. 
(2)[How did the defendant appear at the trial?]: The defendant was dressed in a wrinkled and 
tattered suit.  His hair was messy and he appeared to have not shaved or bathed in several days. 
(3)[How was the defendant dressed at the time the surveillance operation took place?]: The 
defendant was dressed in a dirty red sweater that was frayed  
(4)[What price did the seller ask for the bicycle?]-The bicycle thief offered to sell the bicycle to 
the defendant for $50. 
(7)[What was the defendant’s previous criminal recod?]- The defendant has been convicted of a 
variety of other crimes, indicating a consistent pat ern of criminal activity. 
(8)[How many other individuals were arrested for the current surveillance operation?]- Despite 
frequent usage of this surveillance operation by the local police department, very few arrests 
have been made. 
(9)[How did the defendant act at the time of the arr st?]- When police arrested the defendant, he 
was confused and easily complied with law enforcement. 
(10)[How was the seller dressed at the time the surveillance operation took place?]- The seller 
was dressed in a professional authoritative manner, with a black suit, slacks, and dress shoes. 
(11)[Where did the seller claim he obtained the bicycle?]- The defendant made no attempts to 
ascertain the origins of the bicycle and seemed only confused when the seller stated he had 
“randomly found it in the street”. 
 
Brain Damage Neutral Envelopes 
(5)[What was the prosecutor’s opening statement?]: The Prosecuting Attorney claimed the 
evidence would show that on March 23, 2011, John Smith, knowingly and willingly purchased a 
bicycle that he believed was stolen. He further claimed that the actions of the defendant had both 
the motivation and capacity to have purchased the bicycle and would have eventually sought to 
purchase a stolen bicycle even if he had never beenapproached by the undercover agent. 
(6)[What was the defending lawyer’s opening statement?]: The defense attorney opened by 
admitting that Smith purchased the bicycle that he believed was stolen, but could not be held 
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accountable for his actions due to receiving a traum tic brain injury at a young age that interferes 
with his ability to make decisions. The defense attorney claimed that the brain injury was such 
that Smith has extreme difficulty with impulse control.  He stated that had his client not 
sustained the injury, Smith never would have purchased the stolen bicycle. The defense attorney 
concluded his opening statement by telling the jurythat due to the nature of his injury his client 
lacked the ability to form intent. 
 
Envelopes the same for both trial types 
 
Guilty Envelopes 
(2)[What was the condition of the defendant’s own bicycle?]- The defendant’s bicycle is in poor 
condition and appears to be in urgent need of repai. 
(3)[What was the defendant’s own bicycle valued at?]- The defendant’s bicycle is initially 
valued at $150. 
(4)[What was the defendant’s claimed reason for being at crime scene?]- The defendant claims 
he was in the area because he was taking the long way to a delivery site. 
(6)[At what time of day did the alleged crime take place?]- The crime took place at 
approximately 8 PM, well after nightfall. 
(10)[What was the defendant’s cellphone calling history?]- The defendant’s calling history for 
the day consisted of three relevant calls the first of which was to a bicycle repair shop, the 
second to a bicycle sales shop, and the third to his bank. 
 
Not Guilty Envelopes 
(2)[What was the condition of the defendant’s own bicycle?]- The defendant’s bicycle is in 
excellent condition and does not appear to be in need of any repair. 
(3)[What was the defendant’s own bicycle valued at?]- The defendant’s bicycle is initially 
valued at $450. 
(4)[What was the defendant’s claimed reason for being at crime scene?]- The defendant claims 
he was in the area because he was taking a shortcut n the way to a delivery site. 
(6)[At what time of day did the alleged crime take place?]- The crime took place at 
approximately 3 PM, in the middle of the workday. 
(10)[What was the defendant’s cellphone calling history?]- The defendant’s calling history for 
the day indicated no out of the ordinary calls. 
 
Neutral Envelopes 
(1)[What is the value of the stolen bicycle?]- The bicycle is valued at $500. 
(5)[What is the color of the stolen bicycle?]- The bicycle was red with white stripes. 
(7)[What was the location of the alleged crime?]- The crime took place in Whitenord residential 
subdivision, at the corner of William and Erickson. 
(8)[What is the defendant’s eye color?]- The defendant’s eye color is brown. 
(9)[What were the results of the fingerprint analysis?]- Fingerprints lifted from the handlebars of 
the stolen bike match those of the defendant. 
(11)[What is the defendant’s hair color?]- The defendant’s hair color is brown. 
(12)[How was the prosecuting attorney dressed at the rial?]- The prosecuting attorney was 
dressed professionally with a black suit jacket, red ti , and black slacks. 
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(13)[How was the defending attorney dressed at the rial?]- The prosecuting attorney was dressed 
professionally with a black suit jacket, red tie, and black slacks. 
(14)[What is the defendant’s shoe size?]- The defendant wears a size 9 shoe. 
(15)[Who was the presiding judge?]- The presiding judge was Justice Joshua Sweeney, who was 
45 years old and was dressed appropriately for a judge. 
(16)[What is the relationship status of the defendant?]- The defendant was single and had never 
been married. 
(17)[What is the height of the defendant?]- The defendant is 5’10’’. 






Table 1. Logistic Regression analysis for absolute verdicts in Experiment 1. 
   















= 0.07       
    Defense (Brain Damage) 0.53 0.25 4.70* 1.70 [1.05, 2.75] .030 
    Defense (Entrapment) 1.16 0.25 21.33** 3.17 [1.94, 5.18] <.001 
    Consensus 0.11 0.20 0.28 1.11 [0.75, 1.65] .600 









= 0.02       
    Consensus x Defense (Brain Damage) -0.98 0.50 3.83* 0.38 [0.14, 1.00] .050 
    Distinctiveness x Defense (Brain Damage) -0.88 0.50 3.04 0.42 [0.16, 1.12] .081 
    Consensus x Defense (Entrapment) -0.38 0.51 0.55 0.69 [0.25, 1.85] .459 
    Consensus x Defense (Entrapment) -0.50 0.51 0.98 0.61 [0.22, 1.64] .323 









= 0.01       
    Consensus x Distinctiveness x Defense (Brain Damage) -0.82 1.00 0.68 0.44 [0.06, 3.12] .410 
    Consensus x Distinctiveness x Defense (Entrapment) -0.81 1.02 0.64 0.44 [0.06, 3.25] .424 





Table 2. Second step of Logistic Regression analysis for CCDPO scales in Experiment 1. 
   















= 0.03       
    Defense (Brain Damage) -0.59 0.25 5.55 0.56 [0.34, 0.91] .018 
    Defense (Entrapment) -1.24 0.26 23.25*** -.29 [0.18, 0.48] <.001 
    Consensus  0.15 0.20 0.51 1.16 [0.78, 1.73] .474 
    Distinctiveness -0.24 0.20 1.38 0.79 [0.53, 1.17] .240 
    PDPS  0.04 0.02 5.60* 1.04 [1.01, 1.07] .018 









= 0.02       
    Defense (Brain Damage) X PDPS -.045 0.04 1.63 0.96 [0.89, 1.02] .202 
    Defense (Brain Damage) X DPCCS  .022 0.02 0.91 1.02 [0.98, 1.07] .340 
    Defense (Entrapment) X PDPS -.087 0.04 5.81 0.92 [0.85, 0.98] .016 
    Defense (Entrapment) X DPCCS  .011 0.02 0.23 1.01 [0.97, 1.06] .636 
       





Table 3. Overall Mean (SE) Times Each Type of Evidence was Selected in Experiment 2. 
Evidence Type Average Times Selected 
Factual 0.366 (0.036)a 
Consensus 0.471 (0.019)ab 
Distinctiveness 0.538 (0.018)abc 
Coherence 0.516 (0.022)ad 
Filler 0.071 (0.011)abcde 
Opening Statements 0.634 (0.044)abcde 





Table 4. Mean (SE) Times Each Type of Evidence was Selected Based on Trial Type in 
Experiment 2. 
Trial Type 
Evidence Type Brain Damage Entrapment 
Factual 0.412 (0.055)a 0.320 (0.045)f 
Consensus 0.359 (0.024)b 0.583 (0.030)fg 
Distinctiveness 0.546 (0.021)abc 0.530 (0.030)fh 
Coherence 0.495 (0.029)bd 0.536 (0.031)fi 
Filler 0.048 (0.008)abcde 0.095 (0.021)fghij 
Opening Statements 0.657 (0.059)abde 0.610 (0.066)fj 







Figure 1. Average Times Each Type of Evidence was Selected in Experiment 2 Based on 
Trial Type. 
 
































Table 5. Overall Mean (SE) Rank for Each Type of Evidence in Experiment 2. 
Evidence Type Average Rank Order 
Factual 8.59 (0.83)a 
Consensus 11.25 (0.40)ab 
Distinctiveness 13.24 (0.42)abc 
Coherence 12.21 (0.46)ad 
Filler 1.55 (0.19)abcde 
Opening Statements 15.26 (1.12)abde 





Table 6. Mean (SE) Rank of Each Type of Evidence Based on Trial Type in Experiment 2. 
Trial Type 
Evidence Type Brain Damage Entrapment 
Factual 9.55 (1.28)a 7.62 (1.04)a 
Consensus 8.45 (0.50)b 14.07 (0.64)ab 
Distinctiveness 12.96 (0.48)abc 13.53 (0.69)ac 
Coherence 11.27 (0.63)bcd 13.16 (0.65)ad 
Filler 1.08 (0.19)abcde 2.02 (0.34)abcde 
Opening Statements 15.55 (1.44)abde 14.96 (1.70)ae 





Figure 2. Average Rank for Each Type of Evidence in Experiment 2 Based on Trial Type. 
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